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Summary findings
Kane explains how differences in the informational and  contracts.
contracting environments of countries affect the optimal  The weaker a country's informational, ethical, and
design of their financial safety nets and their optimal  corporate governance environment, the more a wholly
strategies for managing financial crises.  governmental system of explicit deposit guarantees is apt
He explains how to design and operate safety nets at  to undermine bank safety and stability. How a country's
minimum cost to taxpayers and well-managed banks in  safety net evolves depends on the ability of the private
countries whose informational and contracting  and public sectors to value banks, discipline risk-taking,
technologies differ. His basic premise is that optimal  and resolve financial difficulties promptly. And political
regulation is not a one-size-fits-all proposition.  accountability is essential if the public part of these tasks
A country's safety net should be transparent, deterrent  is to evolve effectively and efficiently.
to too much risk-taking, and accountable, but Kane  As a rule of thumb, safety-net managers should avoid
shows large differences across countries in the  either subsidizing or taxing bank risk-taking, says Kane.
transparency and deterrence banks afford their  Even if analysts could formulate a beneficial tax or
depositors, highlighting why the design of safety nets  subsidy rule, it is unlikely that channeling the effect
must allow for differences in the enforceability of private  through a government-run  deposit insurance system that
fails to account publicly for the size of taxpayers' stake
could improve upon more straightforward arrangements.
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Sinkey  and James  Thomson for valuable  comments  on a previous  draft of this paper.Optimal financial regulation is not a one-size-fits-all proposition. This paper seeks to
gather evidence on how differences in the informational and contracting environments of
individual countries have influenced the design of their financial safety nets and their strategies
for managing safety-net breakdowns.
Its larger purpose is to apply the concept of revealed preference to evidence on safety-net
design to frame a menu of principled policy advice that takes reasonable account of differences
in the informational transparency, counterparty protections, and political accountability found in
individual countries.
I.  The Safety Net As Metaphor
A net is a mesh that has been rigged to serve a set of particular purposes. In erecting a
literal "safety net," a circus manager has in mind at least two purposes. The direct purpose is to
protect falling acrobats by having the net catch them before they can harm themselves and
traumatize the audience by splattering against the ground.  However, the net's  larger, indirect
purpose is to enhance audience enjoyment in a positive way.  The net does this by making it
economically rational for circus acrobats to undertake difficult, but do-able stunts in which the
danger of a spectacular fall seems very real.
The word do-able is emphasized to clarify that the net is meant to encourage prudent risk-
taking.  The net's entertainment function is frustrated unless the acrobats almost always complete
their stunts successfully. Carrying out a simple trick is typically more engaging than failing to
accomplish a complicated one.  Trapeze and tightwire performers that fall repeatedly into the net
earn boos and catcalls that sensible circus managers want to avoid.
A circus manager must also make sure that the costs of building and maintaining the net
do not exceed the benefits it produces.  Managers must balance a series of subtle tradeoffs
between original costs, monitoring expense, safety, visibility, and audience response.  There is
no general reason to suppose that governments should direct net managers either to tax or to
subsidize institutional risk-taking.  In general, widespread and sturdy meshes are safer, but they
are more costly and -by being more visible-  lessen the sense of risk sharing that lies at the heart
of audience enjoyment. Sturdy filament materials exist whose thinness can make the net less
visible, but these materials may make the net more costly to build and maintain.  Finally,
2whenever the net a manager erects proves unable to stop an unfolding disaster, emergency
medical treatment must be accessed optimally and the manager must expect a storm of
condemnation to rain down on his head from all sides: from performers, from circus owners, and
from the audience.
Whether or not the elements of the net are defined by explicit statutes, authorities in
every country establish a de facto safety net for banks and support the net by incurring
monitoring costs and penalizing to some degree fraudulent and corrupt behavior in financial and
governmental transactions.  This paper seeks to explain how to design and operate safety nets at
minimum cost to taxpayers and well-managed banks in countries whose informational and
contracting environments differ in stylized ways.
A country's  financial safety net shares four metaphorical entailments with its circus
counterpart.  First, like acrobats, financial institutions may choose to engage in activities so risky
that critical mistakes can quickly cripple them or even end their existence.  In the metaphor,
borrowers and depositors play the dual role of onlookers and manufacturers of trapezes and
tightwire platforms, while taxpayer audience members also own shares in the circus.  Financial
safety nets serve not just to protect borrowers, depositors, and taxpayers from being harmed by
financial-institution mistakes, but also to encourage individual institutions to accept the risks
associated with funding economically productive activities. In countries where reliable public
information about business performance is in short supply, banks tend to dominate the flow of
institutional finance.  In such circumstances, a country's  financial safety net reduces to its
arrangements for protecting bank customers and for monitoring, assisting, and controlling banks.
Second, just as circus managers do, regulators must guard against excessive risk-taking
and must manage the several costs and benefits the safety net produces. Safety nets for banks
may be instructively conceived as a nexus of contracts that help them cope with runs and other
economic shocks (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Kane, 1995; Brock, 1999). Each net is a
multidimensional policy scheme that is alleged to balance the costs and benefits generated by:
1.  protecting bank customers from being blindsided by bank insolvencies;
2.  limiting aggressive risk-taking by banks;
3.  preventing and controlling damage from bank runs;
4.  detecting and resolving insolvent banks; and
5.  allocating across society whatever losses occur when an insolvent bank is closed.
3Third, a country's financial safety net may be analyzed as a figurative mesh whose
filaments tie regulatory officials and bank stakeholders into a web of mutually reinforcing
contracts.  Officials must be made accountable for any design flaws or breakdowns in stringing
the web that compromise the net's overall effectiveness. For strategies of crisis prevention to be
maximally successful, the web of contracts must hold top regulators accountable for measuring
and managing the social costs and risk-taking incentives generated by their decisions about the
net's various design features. Cross-country variation in the legal and private-informnation
environment should influence these decisions. Ideally, the design of the regulatory portion of net
should tie securely into the characteristics of the particular financial system and economy in
which it is embedded.  To fashion a weave of the right size and strength, decisions bearing on the
cost and effectiveness of net components should be observable enough to be disciplined by
appropriate market and budgetary tests.
Finally, authorities must understand that on occasion even the best-designed safety net
will fracture or prove too small.  This means authorities must develop and regularly review
strategic plans for managing financial crises and train their staff in the use of crisis-management
protocols.  Paradoxically, unless the safety net is backed up by solid crisis planning,
improvements in the safety net may result in less frequent but more devastating crises. On
balance, the more effective a nation's safety net becomes, the less likely it is that regulatory
personnel will have prior hands-on experience in coping with severe crisis pressures.
Examining how and where the circus metaphor breaks down is also instructive. The rub
is that --unlike the splattering of an unlucky, incompetent, or well-connected acrobat--
breakdowns in financial safety nets are not imunediately  visible to the naked eye. This
indiscemibility creates opportunities for incumbent regulators to conceal and sugarcoat
infornation  about difficulties that occur during their particular terms in office.  Regulators can
strongly influence the character of information that may and may not be entered on bank balance
sheets and income statements. Precisely because top regulators do not want to see their
professional reputation besmirched by being held responsible for a financial-institution disaster,
their ability to influence reporting protocols can be a mixed blessing.  Defects in transparency
support an incentive to delay insolvency resolution, so as to allow individual banks whose
insolvency is not yet widely recognized an opportumity  to gamble for resurrection at taxpayer and
competitor expense.
4To the extent that regulators can block the flow of adverse information, their sensitivity
to public criticism tempts managers and owners of insolvent institutions to reinforce this
dangerous incentive conflict. They offer subtle and unsubtle benefits to top regulators who are
willing to conceal an incipient crisis and to accept the social costs of postponing the strong
public actions that may be needed to restore banking solvency. By helping to hide developing
insolvencies, top regulators may reasonably hope to achieve a reputationally "clean" getaway.
Most of the blame for allowing a crisis to develop can be sidestepped by patching whatever signs
of crisis surface on their watch and shifting responsibility for recapitalizing the damaged banking
system to succeeding generations of regulatory officials.  This hope supports efforts to downplay
the importance of crisis planning and to cornmit regulators to work through every incipient
breakdown as if it were a unique event that they had to handle in an ad hoc manner.
II.  Contracting Difficulties that Make a Safety Net Socially Beneficial
Modem finance theory emphasizes that, even in a corruption-resistant society, bank
depositors must worry about controlling incentives for opportunistic behavior by managers,
owners, and borrowers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Diamond, 1984). Besides the difficulties
depositors face in coordinating collective action, thesc incentives have two intertwined roots:
1.  difficulties a depositor faces in obtaining reliable information about unfavorable
developments and observing adverse actions by bank managers, including
recklessness, negligence, incompetence, fraud, and self-dealing (monitoring costs);
2.  difficuities a depositor faces in adequately analyzing and responding to whatever
information their monitoring activity turns up (policing costs).
The tools of regulatory loss control are rulemaking and enforcement.  To understand the
role played by a country's  financial safety net, it is helpful to imagine a world in which
depositors' monitoring and policing costs would be uniformly zero.  In this world, each deposit
contract would be self-enforcing.  Establishing a team of centralized monitors and enforcers to
thwart misconduct by bank insiders would offer no benefit either to banks or to their depositors.
In such a world, changes in a bank's condition and risk exposure would be transparent to
depositors and depositors would possess sufficient expertise and sanctions to deter bank insiders
from trying to take advantage of them.  Maximal transparency describes a framework of
disclosure that would perfectly and costlessly inform depositors about changes in bank
performance and risk-taking activities. To provide a pair of parallel rhyming words, we use
5maximal  deterrency  to describe a situation  in which  depositors  would  immediately  understand
the implications  of information  flows perfectly  and would  be able to protect themselves
completely  and  costlessly  from whatever  threat to their wealth  this information  might  reveal.
The more closely  an economy  comes  to offering  creditors  maximal  transparency  (MT)
and maximal  deterrency  (MD),  the less incremental  value that banks and safety-net  managers  can
create for depositors. In an MTMD  economy,  cash in advance  and credit could substitute
perfectly  for each other in every  payment context. Similarly,  direct and indirect  finance  would
provide  equally  economical  ways  of mobilizing  savings,  of choosing  which real investment
projects  savers  ought  to support  and of deciding  how to price project risk. As envisaged  in the
Capital  Asset Pricing  Model,  corporate  and government  securities  could be offered  in
denominations  small  enough to allow virtually  every individual  saver  to invest  directly  in a
diversified  portfolio  of stocks,  bonds, and derivative  securities.
The MTMD  thought  experiment  clarifies  that safety  nets owe their existence  to
difficulties  of contract  enforcement:  blockages  in information  flows;  differences  in monitoring
costs;  variation  in financial  transaction  costs;  delays in appreciating  and processing  relevant
information;  and the costliness  and inadequacy  of the deterrent  remedies  that individual
depositors  have  available  to them. It also clarifies  that a safety  net entails a five-party  contract.
The net imposes  mutual rights and duties on: bankers,  borrowers,  depositors,  safety-net
managers,  and safety-net  owners  (principally  healthy banks and  taxpayers). The touchstone  by
which  to judge the performance  of safety-net  managers  is the fairness  with which  they treat each
of their counterparties  and the efficiency  with which  they  manage  the diverse  social costs of
coping  with divergences  from MT and MD conditions.
All real-world  economies  establish  a framework  of centralized  bank monitoring  and
deterrent  response. Centralizing  these functions  aims at increasing  depositor  confidence  while
solving  three coordination  problems:  avoiding  redundant  monitoring  expense;  standardizing
contracting  protocols;  and timing and calibrating  disciplinary  action. In principle,  a centralized
monitor-enforcer  makes it unprofitable  for banks to misrepresent  their economic  condition  to
depositors  and to pursue  profit-making  opportunities  that might exploit depositors' informational
disadvantage.  It is not enough for safety-net  managers  to aim at blocking  corrupt  and unwise
flows of institutional  credit  and avoiding  depositor  runs. They  must seek also to minimize  the
social  damage  caused  by temporary  bank illiquidity  and  by lasting  bank insolvencies.  In
administering  lender-of-last-resort  facilities,  safety-net  managers  are expected  to perform  the
6financial tiage  function of shielding solvent, but illiquid institutions from having to sell assets
into momentarily disorderly markets.
In practice, a safety-net manager must have the expertise to wield six categories of
regulatory instruments fairly and efficiently:
1.  record-keeping and disclosure requirements;
2.  activity limitations;
3.  capital, loss-reserving, and other position limits;
4.  takeover rights and other enforcement powers;
5.  lines of credit; and
6.  performance guarantees.
The first four categories define the net managers' authority to regulate the bank; the last two
categories provide credible ways for regulators to bond themselves to exercise their supervisory
authority in the interests of depositors and other creditors.  To complete the web of contract
enforcement, taxpayers must be able to observe and discipline the economic value of their stake
in the rulemaking and enforcement activities that regulators undertake.  Ideally, taxpayers must
impose reporting requirements and establish deterrent rights sufficient to persuade net managers
to deploy their examination, supervisory, and lending powers at minimum economic cost to
society as a whole.  These costs must be defined comprehensively and include both the costs of
operating the net and the costs of managing its occasional breakdown.  Taxpayer-regulator
contracting is important because the practical politics of financial regulation tend to make
regulatory authorities responsive only to immediate bank and depositor concerns.
A nation's safety net is a multiparty web of contractual duties and obligations whose
most palpable features are deposit guarantees and lender-of-last-resort credit facilities. The ideal
or optimal safety net is one that efficiently mitigates the particular monitoring and policing
difficulties that present themselves to banks, depositors, and taxpayers in the informational,
ethical, legal, and economic environment of a particular country at a particular time.  This means
that the optimal design and operation of a country's  safety net must adapt promptly to changes in
the market, legal, bureaucratic, and ethical/cultural problems the net is intended to alleviate.
For the web to establish incentives for bank and regulators that are compatible with the
interests of all other parties, net design must be environment-specific.  As a rule of thumb,
information systems and supervisory technology for monitoring bank capital and risk exposures
7should  be made  transparent  at least  to outside  experts  and regulatory  discipline  should  mimic
market  procedures.
Evidence  of Variation  in Informational  Transparency
Depositors  want to be sure  that deposit  interest rates  fairly compensate  them for the risk.
exposures  that bank loans  and investments  pass  through  to them. The "information"  needed  to
benchmark  this compensation  consists  of valid facts and projections  that would  help  a well-
trained  financial  analyst  to calculate  the market  value of bank net worth as the difference
between  present  discounted  values of bank assets and liabilities.
When  a nation's financial  markets  inaccurately  identify  and price risks,  they misdirect
savings  and investment. Such  misdirection  undermines  a nation's economic  growth  and well-
being. It is helpful  to think of bank disclosures  as ore and information  as a mineral  that
depositors  and regulators  can, with effort  and only imperfectly,  extract  from this ore. Extraction
is imperfect  for two reasons:  because  banks have a legitimate  interest  in reserving  proprietary
information  for their own  use and because  they may want to conceal  potentially  damaging
information  from other  parties.
Bank  regulators  are supposed  to identify  and  promptly  correct  material  misinformation.
The less effectively  the ethical  norm  of "fair dealing"  constrains  the business  dealings  of
corporate  and government  officials  in a given  country,  the more thoroughly  safety-net  managers
ought  to doublecheck  data  provided  by banks and  bank borrowers. However,  as a practical
matter,  strong  incentives  may push  regulators  in the reverse  direction. The less  effectively
ethical  norms  and investigative  journalism  constrain  government  officials,  the more  likely it
becomes  that safety-net  managers  may  be enlisted  to use their instruments  to help  banks and at
least  some  bank customers  to exploit  taxpayers.
In financially  sophisticated  environments,  the reliability  of disclosures  about  bank values
is tested and disciplined  --albeit  imperfectly--  by an array of outside  parties. Rules governing
bank disclosures  come  both from statutory  and administrative  law. Statutes  are shaped  in
legislatures.  Regulations  governing  how to value and itemize  sources  and uses of funds are
established  by administrative  agencies  and self-regulatory  organizations.  Enforcement  by
rulemaking  entities  is subject  to due-process  and constitutional  review  by a nation's  judiciary
system.
Dishonest  corporate  and government  reporting  is additionally  deterred  by the knowledge
that information  flows  will also be reviewed  informally  by private "watchdog  institutions:"
8professional accountants, credit bureaus, credit-rating agencies, an independent financial press,
investment advisors, and even academic researchers.  However, the information-verification
mission of these watchdogs often conflicts with their other economic interests.  Hence, even in
high-income countries, interinstitutional competition may be weak, reporting standards may be
relatively uninformative, and validity checks on bank and borrower disclosures may allow a
great many informational impurities to survive the smelting process.
Recapping the discussion, across countries informational transparency (T) varies with
accounting integrity (Al), ethical norms (EN), press freedom (PF), and the quality and credibility
of compensating restraints regulators place on financial transactors (R).  In symbols:
T=T(AI,EN,PF;R).  (1)
Several research institutions rate in different ways the quality of information available to
depositors and taxpayers in different countries.  Table 1 reproduces measures of the relative
informnativeness  of a country's accounting standards, the degree of corruption observed in
government or business transactions, and the extent of press freedom.  The table shows that the
quality of relevant information varies greatly across countries.  The table also indicates that what
we may call accounting and ethical "integrity" correlate positively with press freedom and each
other and also with the level of a country's per capita income.  Across the 41 countries for which
the spottier accounting index exists, accounting integrity and 1990-1995 average real per capita
GDP show a correlation of .59, while the correlation coefficient for accounting integrity with
ethical integrity and press freedom in this subset of countries is .63 and .40, respectively.  The
first principal component of the three information variables explains 73.4 percent of their joint
variance.  For the 66 countries for which the corruption index has been constructed, the first
principal component of the press-freedom and corruption indexes explains 80.1 percent of these
variable's joint variance and the correlation of ethical integrity with per capita GDP is .80.  The
index of press freedom (which is actually available for 73 countries) shows an r=.67 with per
capita GDP.
These correlations suggest not that the level of development determines the level of
informational transparency or vice versa, but that both variables are simultaneously determined
by omitted variables.  These omitted variables may be interpreted as a culture's  shared beliefs
about what is tolerable and intolerable deal-making behavior.  Using this perspective frames per
capita GDP as an imperfect control for evolving social and cultural attitudes that strengthen the
enforceability of financial contracts.
9For a safety net to operate fairly and efficiently in environments where informational and
ethical integrity are low, the policy-making process of selecting design features must be open
enough to establish accountability between regulators and taxpayers. Political Accountability
increases with the freedom accorded a nation's press and with the political and economic
freedoms it grants its citizens to challenge government policies.  However, the correlation of
measures of ethical integrity with the Freedom House Index of press freedom and Heritage
Foundation indexes of economic freedoms suggests that accountability is often weak in the
particular countries where it most needs to be strong.
Where accounting integrity meets a threshold standard of informativeness, independent
credit-rating agencies can consolidate a bank's accounting disclosures into a broad measure of
the risk the bank passes through to its depositors. Using data only on banks whose deposit
quality has been rated by Moody's, Table 2 reports annual values for a system-wide "bank
credit-rating proxy" from 1987 to 1997. The data show many gaps and cover at most about 50
countries. Still, the number of countries for which it is possible to calculate this proxy is
expanding.
For the period 1987 to 1997 and for the much larger sample of countries studied in Table
1, Table 3 displays the percentage of a country's total assets that was held in banks whose
deposit quality was rated by Moody's.  This table shows that in many low-income countries, a
sizeable portion of the banking industry is yet to be rated.  In these countries, transparency is so
weak that the outside monitoring embodied in the credit-rating proxy provides only an
incomplete doublecheck of the reliability of self-reported banking information.
Evidence of Variation in Depositors' Deterrent Capacity
Given a country's level of informational transparency, an individual depositor's ability to
protect itself from looming bank or borrower defaults is limited by the deterrent rights and
enforcement powers conveyed to contracting parties by its country's legal system. A depositor
may be regarded as holding a contingent claim on the stock of its bank.  Similarly, a portfolio of
stock options written on the bank's corporate borrowers is imbedded in the value of bank's loans.
Both sets of stock options come into the money when banks and their borrowers choose to
default.
All defects in counterparty rights, in their enforceability, or in judicial and bureaucratic
efficiency leave financial markets less complete and banks and bank depositors more vulnerable
10to default. Deterrency (D) depends on a country's systems for policing corporate governance
(CG) and property rights (PR):
D = D(CG,  PR; T)  (2)
Weaknesses in D disadvantage banks as lenders, their depositors as creditors, and
taxpayer-owners of the financial safety net. Where counterparty rights are poorly protected, a
rational saver will always be reluctant to trust its funds to unrelated parties. Table 4 summarizes
cross-country differences in corporate governance, while Table 5 reports measures of broader
property-rights protection. These tables show that legal constraints on opportunities for a
"'controlling-insider"  to exploit creditors and minority shareholders differ greatly around the
globe.
In each table, countries are grouped by per capita income.  Much as we found for the
informational-integrity variables arrayed in Table 1, alternative measures of deterrent protections
prove highly correlated with one another and the level of deterrency increases on average as per
capita income rises. For the 41 countries where the relevant indexes of accounting and ethical
integrity both exist, each correlates positively with the various indexes of counterparty
protections.  The correlation between accounting integrity and the five property-rights indexes in
Table 5 ranges from .53 to .67.  The correlations the property-rights indexes show with per capita
GDP and ethical integrity run even higher, ranging from .77 to .89.
The corporate-governance variables are less collinear than the property-rights indexes.
Seven eigenvalues of the corporate-governance covariance matrix exceed the random-correlation
benchmark of unity, while only the first eigenvalue of the property-rights matrix does and the
corresponding eigenvector is able to explain 84.8 percent of the joint variance. This collinearity
in property-rights protections reinforces our contention that unmeasured socio-cultural norms
and freedoms drive these variables and encourages us to focus further analysis on the three
property-rights variables that are available for most countries.
Although bank credit-rating agencies seek to overcome weaknesses in informational
transparency, the profitability of doing this varies across countries with the quality and
usefulness of financial information. As a result, the average proxy value (CR) reported for a
particular country in Table 2 only covers its principal banks. As measured by CR, reported
weakness correlates strongly and inversely with accounting standards (r = -.58), indexes of
counterparty deterrent rights (the highest individual r = -.91), ethical integrity (r = -.74), and
press and economic freedoms (r = .63 and .73, respectively). Because deterrent rights, press and
11economic freedoms, and ethical and accounting integrity are so highly correlated, the marginal
influence of individual variables cannot be established by their statistical significance in a
multiple-regression framework (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980). The confluence of
opportunistic and disciplinary forces is so strong that at five percent significance, corporate-
governance and counterparty protections do not significantly improve our ability to predict the
bank credit-rating proxy.  Using only the corruption index and per capita GDP as regressors to
explain CR for the 51 countries for which CR exists produces satisfactory t-values and an
adjusted multiple correlation coefficient R of .81.  As a proxy for informational transparency, the
significance of the corruption index supports two hypotheses: that informational reliability
affects bank ratings and that banking fragility increases as it becomes harder for depositors and
taxpayers to monitor banks and bank regulators.
Evidence of Cross-Country Variation in Accountability
No existing data set specifically documents cross-country differences in top officials'
accountability for safety-net performance.  However, measures of central-bank independence
have been compiled for 56 countries by Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) and inverse
indexes of press and economic freedoms are compiled by Freedom House and the Heritage
Foundation, respectively.  Each of these indexes proxies to some degree the accountability
taxpayers impose on economic policymakers in general.  The freer is a country's press, the more
readily taxpayers can observe and respond to government policymaking decisions. Similarly, the
less coercive are a country's economic policies, the easier it is to observe circumventive behavior
that both limits and underscores the potential damage that inefficient or unfair policies might
otherwise generate.  Finally, for central-bank officials, complete legal independence is the
opposite of political subservience. Cukierman et al. (1992, pp. 380-381) produce a measure of
the extent to which central-bank officials have the authority and autonomy to pursue the goal of
price stability even when this goal conflicts with other government objectives. By extension, the
more politically independent is a country's central bank, the more readily taxpayer can hold its
top officials responsible for the macroeconomic effects of the supervisory policies the bank
adopts.
Like most other variables, central-bank independence and press and economic freedoms
prove significantly correlated with GDP, with correlation coefficients running as high as .69.
We interpret the marginal explanatory power of cross-country declines in central-bank
12independence or increases in economic repression as evidence of taxpayers' inability to hold
safety-net managers accountable for the costs of the policies they follow.
Evidence of Cross-Country Variation in Banking Market Structure
This section considers how the influence of transparency, deterrency, and accountability
might be affected by the level of banking concentration. In countries where actual competitors
are few and entry protections are effective, the net interest margin between loan and deposit
interest rates is apt to be high. Given an opportunity to extract monopoly rents from their
customers, incumbent banks would be apt to charge interest rates on loans that lie above their
marginal funding costs and to pay interest rates on bank deposits that lie below their marginal
value to the bank.
In the 72 countries for which both banking-market indexes exist, the three-firm
concentration ratio and net interest margin are negatively related to GDP (r = -.29 and -.22,
respectively). However, the banking concentration ratio does not reliably correlate with the net
interest margin.  The correlation between the net interest margin and the three-firm concentration
ratio is an insignificant .14. The best predictor of a country's net interest margin in our data set
is the Heritage Foundation's inverse measure of the average expected inflation rate (r=.47). At
5-percent significance, neither banking concentration nor the net interest margin is significantly
correlated with press freedom or accounting and ethical integrity and both variables show few
reliable correlations with deterrent rights.  However, the concentration ratio is correlated with
economic repression (r ;  .30 for five of the Heritage Foundation's  indexes). Observing a
correlation between banking-market concentration and economic repression suggests that a
country's banking market structure is flattened by events that increase customer opportunities to
transact more freely.
To persuade government officials to resist entry requires local bankers to devise a
politically workable way of sharing government-generated rents with friendly politicians and
regulators. Deducting the side payments a bank makes to support entry protections produces
what we may call its net regulatory rent.
In principle, the capitalized value of the projected future net regulatory rents an
incumbent bank can earn is an intangible asset that influences a bank's earnings, stock price,
market capitalization, and credit rating. However, technological change continually undermines
the effectiveness of the entry barriers a country erects by expanding avoidance opportunities for
customers and outside institutions. Monopoly rents create incentives for customers and foreign
13banks to use technological  advances  as a way of innovating  around govermnent  restrictions. In a
world of rapid technological  change,  enlisting  the aid of government  officials  can only
temporarily  slow  the rate of outside  entry. Thanks  to the communications  and information
revolutions,  globalization  is driving  the capitalized  net value of entry-restriction  rents  to banks  in
high-barrier  countries  toward negative  values. The benefits that entry restrictions  deliver  to local
banks are eventually  forced  below the costs of cultivating  the political  influence  necessary  to
support  them. Once  the profitability  of local banks  becomes  dependent  on the favors  of
government  officials,  schemes  for compensating  friendly officials  impose  tax-like  influence-
peddling  costs that --as banking  market structures  meld globally-are  eventually  bound  to
exceed  the benefits  that entry restrictions  can reasonably  produce.
Over time, entry  tends to benefit  host-country  customers  by pushing loan and deposit
interest  rates in their favor. This kind of path dependence  makes it impossible  to sign a priori the
effect  that banking  market structure  has on safety-net  design. The more important  efforts  to limit
banking  competition  to sustain  bank profits  have been in the past, the more rapidly  financial
innovation  can enable foreign and domestic  nonbank  competitors  to wean  high-margin  business
away  from local banks today. Where  a country's  market structure  is in transition,  banking
concentration  is more apt to be a sign  of large banks' local political clout and vulnerability  to
outside  competition  than of their continuing  capacity  to earn monopoly  profits.
III. Cross-Country  Differences  in Safety-Net  Design  Features
In the absence  of MT and MD, depositors  must watch for harm from two directions:
1.  from past losses that bank insiders  have managed  (possibly  with regulatory
connivance)  to conceal  from public  view;
2.  from hidden  exposures  to future  losses from illiquidity,  bad luck, incompetence,
negligence,  fraud, corruption,  or zombieness.
For the safety net to efficiently  and fairly protect  depositors  from these dangers,  the net's
managers  must incorporate  design  features  into the mesh  that counter  the particular  weaknesses
in transparency  and deterrency  that characterize  financial  transactions  in their country. For best
results,  the reasoning  leading to particular  design decisions  should  be made transparent  to
taxpayers,  so that outside  analysts  can challenge  and deter decisions  that threaten  to harm  the
public  interest.
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presents data on the major ways that deposit-insurance coverage, management, pricing, and
funding differ across nations.  Like most of the data presented in this paper, all but one of the
variables (the coverage limit) are classificatory in character and lack a natural scale.  Since the
foreign-exchange value of each local currency limit fluctuates over time, even the coverage limit
cannot be converted to a time-consistent cross-country scale.
The most important difference is whether the guarantees provided to depositors are made
partially explicit or left completely implicit.  Guarantees are explicit when they are embodied in
enforceable obligations that may be collected from the insurer's assets as a matter of law.
Explicit systems are usually funded from ex ante premiums or ex post assessments imposed on
eligible institutions.  Although implicit deposit insurance is by nature unfunded, it is important
and exists always and everywhere that banks are formally chartered by a specific government.
Guarantees are implicit when their enforceability depends on public confidence in the strength of
recognized political incentives for a country's leaders to bail out or rescue stakeholders in banks
that become economically insolvent.  Even in an explicit system, a degree of implicit insurance
comes from the discretion authorities have to treat troubled institutions mercifully.  An incipient
banking crisis creates political incentives for incumbent officials in any government with an
explicit system to extend regulatory forbearances, subsidized loans, and unfunded de facto
coverages that exceed the formal limits specified in the nation's laws and regulations.  Also, in
many countries, one or more banks are state-owned.  For such banks, implicit deposit insurance
is widely perceived to be absolute.
During the 20th Century, socio-cultural expectations and cross-country pressures have
added deposit insurance to the mix of baseline governmental responsibilities in many countries.
Because implicit insurance always exists, whatever explicit limits a government places on the
insurance it writes matter less than it might formally appear.  Politicians reserve options to
extend coverages beyond formal limits at taxpayer expense when and if that serves politicians'
collective interests.  The probability is far from zero that extracontractual coverage will be
provided when market-mimicking regulatory discipline would better promote taxpayer interests.
Explicit deposit insurance can easily constitute an entry-deterring barrier to exit.  This
occurs when deposit insurers allow troubled and inefficient deposit institutions to survive beyond
what we could call their "natural death."  Instead of assuring the prompt exit of firms that make
crippling mistakes or allow themselves to become insolvent for any reason, deposit insurance can
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supported by government guarantees, they bid down profit margins in the industry to
unsustainably low levels that render competing firrns unprofitable. This is most likely to occur
when politicians are unwilling to allow these institutions' contribution to politically inspired
credit-allocation programs to be disrupted.
In the United States, pressure that built up in the exit drainpipe starting in the mid-1960s
was released in the 1980s by an explosion of belated deposit-institution exits. Many now-
departed firms were living-dead institutions whose insolvency could and should have been
resolved long ago.  Some of the others were marginal institutions that might have survived had
their competitors' profit margins and risk-taking incentives not been allowed to become badly
distorted.
It is important that society keep in place economically reasonable exit pressure on poorly
performing deposit institutions.  When deposit insurance retards exit, new entry is discouraged
and healthy competitors and taxpayers are routinely required to help ruined firms to keep
themselves in play.  Such a policy encourages the overexpansion of very high-risk enterprises
and assigns taxpayers a badly structured option on the stock of failing banks. Taxpayers are
required to pay off future losses but receive very little opportunity to participate in gains. The
most that taxpayers can receive from a troubled institution is relief from the loss exposure to
which bailout arrangements have committed them.
Table 6 documents that, during the 1980s and 1990s, countries in many regions adopted
explicit deposit insurance. In Asia and Europe, explicit deposit-insurance guarantees often
extend even to accounts whose value is denominated entirely in foreign currencies.
Figure 1 indicates that explicit insurance is part of the "best practices" policy standards
promulgated in IMF policy reports (Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal, 1996 and Garcia, 1999).
Whether these standards are in fact wise advice is the principal policy question addressed in this
study.  Introducing explicit deposit insurance imposes costs as well as benefits on any society
that adopts it.  The major cost is to diminish depositor discipline on bank risk-taking by
strengthening the implicit guarantees that government officials otherwise convey.  Explicit
arrangements reinforce implicit guarantees by providing bureaucratic and political mechanisms
for patching weak banks.
Where transparency, deterrency, and acountability are weak, installing explicit insurance
may be a great mistake.  In contradistinction to the IMF, we hypothesize that the ambiguous and
16unfunded nature of purely implicit deposit insurance leads depositors in poor informational and
contracting environments to demand a risk premium that is broadly commensurate with the risk-
taking capacity of their bank.
The more completely and more reliably government or private insurers cover depositors
against loss, the less incentive individual depositors have to police the risks their banks can or do
take.  An unintended perversity of credible deposit insurance is that it undernines a depositor's
interest in ethical responsibility to look out for itself by gathering information about an
institution's  financial condition and by reacting to bad news about this condition as soon as it is
received. This anesthetization of depositor concern permits minor bank insolvencies to fester
and grow into deep insolvencies if the incentive system under which regulators labor leads them
to duck rather than confront supervisory problems.
Whenever a country's banking system is visited with overwhelming losses, bank
stakeholders may be expected to twist the controls of representative government to extract
taxpayer assistance. Introducing explicit deposit insurance is attractive to stakeholders of
zombie banks as a device that can end a crisis and temporarily rescue a deeply troubled banking
system without requiring the embarrassment of explicitly recognizing bank losses or imposing
new taxes.  When explicit deposit insurance is introduced in crisis circumstances, the immediate
benefits of the banking-system rescue inevitably come at the expense of longer-run deterioration
in supervisory and bank risk-taking incentives. Because explicit insurance reduces depositor
pressure for transparency and deterrency, opportunities for engaging in unsound and corrupt
banking practices will expand unless government banking supervision strengthens apace.
Typically, adopting explicit insurance as an emergency measure threatens to enhance the
danger of deeper future crises.  In crisis circumstances, insurance authorities seldom receive
sufficient monitoring and policing authority to compensate for the depositor discipline their
deterrent activity is bound to displace. Moreover, even in cases where the insurer's deterrent
powers are sufficient in principle, safety-net managers are not made adequately accountable for
using these powers in the interests of society as a whole.  When these critical design features are
compromised, explicit deposit insurance encourages a nation's banks to direct a considerable
amount of credit to imprudent longshot investment projects that promise to waste a nation's
scarce savings and reduce the present discounted value of its aggregate stock of real capital.
Confirming these concerns, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998 and 1999b) find that,
when they control statistically for the impact of exogenous crisis-generating forces, the
17likelihood of undergoing a banking crisis is higher in countries that have adopted an explicit
deposit-insurance system than in countries in which guarantees of bank deposits are entirely
implicit in character. A companion paper (1999a) by these same authors shows that open
banking crises are likely to follow the lifting of binding interest-rate ceilings on deposits and that
the likelihood of a crisis is higher in countries where "the rule of law is weak, corruption is
widespread, the bureaucracy is inefficient, and contract enforcement mechanisms are
ineffective." In these environments, capital-impaired institutions are not identified and
disciplined quickly enough to avoid massive losses to insuring agencies and their taxpayer-
owners. The combination of virtually complete coverage and resolution delay encourages
depositors to allow weak institutions to increase risky positions until the aggregate losses
become too large for the insurance system to credibly support.
In principle, several deposit-insurance design features can constrain banks' ability to
exploit weaknesses in transparency and supervisory deterrency. Market discipline can be
generated by assigning private parties a clear margin of responsibility for absorbing at least some
of the losses an insolvent bank accrues. The value to society of incorporating such privatizing
features turns on the credibility of the expectation that government officials will force private
parties to live up to their contractual responsibilities and the presumption that loss-sharing
private parties will not let government procrastination expose them to increasing risks.
One way to privatize bank loss exposures is to make private parties underwrite and
manage some or all of the deposit-insurance system.  In Table 6, when the column labelled
"Management" shows a "2," the deposit insurance system is jointly managed by private and
governmental entities; when it shows a "3," responsibility for insurance is formally private.
Another way to constrain bank risk shifting is to insist that formal insurance coverage be
truly incomplete. Most countries specify an upper limit to the size of deposit balance that is
explicitly protected.  Relatively few countries extend formal coverage to interbank deposits or
accounts denominated in foreign currency. However, the Long-Term Capital Management
rescue clarifies how easily and unaccountably coverage limits can be breached.
The modem literature on deposit-insurance reform stresses the social benefits of private
coinsurance as a mechanism for disciplining and uncovering regulatory mistakes (e.g.,
Calomiris, 1998; Kane, 1992). Coinsurance means that depositors are contractually required to
bear a share of their bank's accrued losses when their bank fails. This share may be defined as a
18combination of a nonindennifiable  loss-sharing percentage and a fixed amount that the insurer
deducts from each depositor's  reimbursable insurance claim.
Although benefits of coinsurance cannot be realized without assured enforcement, they
can be realized without tuming each and every depositor into a loss-bearer.  What matters is to
assign to a designated class of private monitors the information and incentives they need to
control bank risk-taking. About 15 countries make at least some depositors coinsure bank losses.
In practice, putative loss bearers are either very large depositors, bonding companies, or
subordinated debtholders.
Presumptions of politically enforced implicit coverages are particularly strong among
depositors of state-owned banks.  To investigate the effect of this presumption, we use the La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) cross-country index of the relative importance of
state-owned banks (GB, for Government Banking presence).  GB measures the percentage of
aggregate assets in a country's ten largest banks that were controlled in 1995 by state-owned
institutions. The index runs from precisely zero in about eight countries to precisely 100 percent
in three others.  The index is particularly high in socialist and ex-socialist countries.  The median
percentage is about 40 percent in Middle Eastem, Asian, and Latin American countries, and is
notably lower for the so-called industrialized countries of Europe.
The GB variable is significantly and negatively correlated with GDP (-.34), all of the
property-rights and information measures (the median r=-.40), economic freedom (r=-.58), and
three corporate-governance variables.  These correlations support the hypothesis that government
banking presence is likely to be larger in environments where informational integrity, deterrent
rights, and accountability are weak.
IV.  Correlating Deposit-Insurance Design Features with Individual-Country Characteristics
Contracting theory emphasizes that counterparties face strong incentives to minimize the
costs of agency.  Black, Miller, and Posner (1978) conceive of a country's deposit insurers as
"stepping into the shoes of individual depositors."  This conception clarifies that, absent outside
pressure from international institutions, conscientious officials in individual countries would
design their portion of the safety net to cope with the particular deficiencies in transparency and
deterrency that depositors face in their country's financial and economic environment.
This section builds on cross-country data on deposit-insurance characteristics first
assembled by other researchers (e.g., Talley and Mas, 1990; Kyei, 1995; Goldstein and Turner,
191996; Lindgren, Garcia and Saal, 1996; Garcia, 1999; and Demirguc-Kunt and Sobact, 2000).
The analysis seeks to show that observable characteristics of a country's deposit-insurance
system correlate significantly (at the five-percent level) with some of the proxy measures for
transparency, deterrency, and accountability we have identified. Confirming that sensible
bivariate correlations exist supports the hypothesis that cross-country differences in
transparency, deterrency, and accountability matter. The policy implication of this finding is that
IMF and World Bank personnel should recommend changes in the structure of a country's
existing safety net only after carefully analyzing the impact each proposed structural change
promises to have on transparency, deterrency, and accountability.
Explicit vs. Implicit Coverage
We define "expliciticity" (E) as the binary variable which codes a country that offers
depositors explicit guarantees as one and which assigns a zero to countries that offer only
implicit deposit insurance.  Expliciticity is insignificantly correlated with government banking
presence (r=-.08).  However, expliciticity does correlate significantly and sensibly with other
potential determinants: with per capita GDP, the corruption index, the three accountability
indexes, the rating proxy, the concentration index, the first two property-rights indexes, and nine
indexes of corporate governance.  Countries with substantial press and economic freedom, low
banking concentration, central-bank independence, good property-rights scores, good rule-of-law
scores, German or Scandinavian legal origins, and high per capita GDP are apt to have explicit
deposit insurance. Countries that restrict managers' ability to block shareholders from voting
and to disadvantage creditors in various ways are significantly more apt to restrict themselves to
implicit deposit insurance. The explicit-insurance dummy variable shows a strong correlation
with the fiscal-capacity variable, per capita GDP (r=.42). Among the corporate-governance
variables, the highest correlations occur for the management-does-not-stay dummy (r = -.63)
and the index of creditor rights (r = -.55).  Unless a creditor has access to reliable public
information and the capacity to win and exercise deterrent rights, it is unlikely that a country's
insurer could be relied upon to wield taxpayer rights effectively either.
Three corporate-governance indexes are always associated with explicit deposit
insurance: German legal origins; no automatic stay on creditors' right to the secured assets of a
reorganizing firm; and creditors' ability to restrain managerial efforts to throw their firm into a
court-protected reorganization.  As a predictor of expliciticity, a probit equation that uses the
management-does-not-stay dummy as its sole explanatory variable achieves a pseudo-R 2 of .36
20in the 47 countries for which both variables are coded.  Introducing per capita GDP or indexes of
accountability in stepwise fashion cannot significantly improve upon the benchmark
performance of this straightforward creditor-rights explanation.
An alternative way to generate a benchmark equation for E is to consider as predictors
the first few eigenvectors of the 17x17 covariance matrix of corporate-governance variables.
Such eigenvectors are frequently called "principal components."  The first three principal
components of the larger set show correlation coefficients of -.49, +.23, and .25, respectively.
When all three are inserted into a probit model, only the first component is significant and the
pseudo-R 2 is .285.
Privatization Features
Conventional wisdom maintains that private-sector funding and involvement in deposit-
insurance management enhances regulatory incentives to monitor and discipline inappropriate
bank risk-taking.  Private loss-bearers are expected to press for risk-control systems that
substitute economic efficiency for political expediency.
Private participation in deposit-insurance management (PM) is significantly and
positively correlated with all five property-rights indexes, with confiscation risk and rule of law
showing the highest coefficients (.42 and .44, respectively).  Private management participation
also correlates significantly with per capita GDP (r=.5 1), ethical integrity (r = .50), press
freedom (r=.43), and most measures of economic freedom (r : .34).
A probit model that recodes private management as unity and joint or government
management as zero and uses confiscation risk and press restriction as explanatory variables
achieves respective z-values of 2.54 and 2.1 1 and a pseudo-R 2 of .46. This equation supports the
hypothesis that reliable press reports and rule-of-law deterrent rights are necessary before
taxpayers and depositors can be persuaded to put much confidence in a private fund.  Introducing
per capita GDP and bureaucratic quality in stepwise fashion does not significantly improve the
model's predictive performance. An alternative benchmark probit equation using the first
principal components of the property-rights and information variables achieves a pseudo-R 2 of
only .25.
Whether a country explicitly funds its deposit-insurance obligations from bank or
government sources correlates significantly with per capita GDP (r=-.35), the focal three
property-rights variables (r--.37), and preemptive rights (rE-.45). The negative sign of these
21correlations broadly supports the hypothesis that as a device for creating public confidence
explicit funding can partly offset weaknesses in deterrent rights and government fiscal capacity.
Binary variables for other privatization features are not significantly correlated with per
capita GDP, central-bank independence, nor with any of the informational-integrity variables.
However, some other privatization features do correlate with one or another of the property-
rights and corporate-governance variables.
Figure 2 depicts the cross-country trend in adopting explicit insurance over time.  For 66
of the 68 adopting countries, we found data on 1995 GDP at market prices. In this sample, the
date of a country's adoption correlates negatively with GDP and positively with press freedom
and ethical integrity.  The following regression equation uses YR to represent the year of
adoption and GDP to represent 1995 GDP in billions of U.S. dollars:
YR =  1988.3  -. 00067GDP,  R2 =.32, N = 66
(t- 1404.6)  (tP-5.67)
Many recent adoptees show extremely low per capita GDP and a contracting environment
that is so lacking in credibility that it doesn't even register on some of the radar screens from
which we have constructed proxies for transparency, deterrency and accountability.  The 40
adopting countries in our principal sample all had explicit insurance by 1998. For these 40
countries, the binary variable designating whether coinsurance exists (CI) correlates significantly
only with confiscation risk (r=.39) and the condition of being funded partly or exclusively from
government sources (r = -.42).  Nevertheless, all 13 countries in our sample which give
shareholders a preemptive right to buy shares in new issues formally incorporate coinsurance
into their deposit-insurance system.  Using per capita GDP and the first principal components of
information, corporate-governance, property-rights, and accountability variables fails to establish
a satisfactory benchmark probit model for CI. No individual coefficient proves statistically
significant and the pseudo-R 2 is only .14.
V.  Principal-Components Analysis of Design Features
For the sample of countries for which data on design features could be assembled in early
1999 Table 6 reports on eight focal dimensions of individual-country safety nets.  These include
E, CI, PM, whether and how guarantees are funded, the existence of nominal coverage limits,
involuntariness of membership, and whether foreign-denominated and interbank deposits are
also insured.  The collinearity we can observe in the design features suggests that we might use
22principal-components analysis to fashion a few summary measures of the net's character
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999b). Principal-components analysis estimates linear
combinations of features ("factors") that reproduce the covariance observed in individual
elements.  Eigenvectors of the covariance matrix whose corresponding eigenvalue is less than
unity are presumed to express random covariance.
Table 7 shows that only the first three eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of the eight
major design features exceed unity. Cumulatively, their corresponding factors explain 61.6
percent of the variance in design features.
The coefficient loadings that each principal component assigns to individual features
sometimes allow us to interpret them economically.  The first component is a summary measure
of the degree to which the net is subject to private market discipline. This factor places heavy
weights on PM, net funding from private sources as opposed to government sources, and
coinsurance.  The second component measures the breadth of the bank liabilities the net covers.
It assigns very high weights to the binary variables for compulsory membership and coverage of
foreign-denominated liabilities.  The interpretation of the third component is more problematical.
However, to the extent that a system's nominal coverage limits lack credibility, it is fair to regard
limits as potentially disinformational devices for concealing growth in implicit government
guarantees.  Granting the need to delete countries where accountability can be established on
other grounds, a case can be made for treating the third factor as a proxy for the extent of
taxpayer susceptibility to hidden risk shifting by banks.  Table 8 reports the value of the three
factors for each of the 40 countries whose design features we analyze.
VI.  Accountability for Implicit Coverages As a Design Feature
No other index specifically addresses cross-country differences in accountability for the
cost of implicit guarantees.  We have emphasized that every country's  safety-net managers are
pushed and pulled in contradictory directions.  On the one hand, managers are expected to
minimize the risk of a banking disaster.  On the other hand, they are expected to minimize the
cost of supporting troubled banks by subjecting banks to market-mimicking disciplines.  Because
exercising market-mimicking discipline would help depositors to identify weak banks, a hard-
nosed net manager may expect to be blamed after the fact if a disruptive bank run ensues.  This
expectation imposes on every net manager a painful tradeoff between the immediate bureaucratic
and reputational benefits that can be reaped by being merciful to troubled banks and the
23unmeasured  long-run  costs  that an insolvent  bank is apt to shift onto taxpayers  when  its
insolvency  is not resolved  promptly.
Society  must recognize  the problem that opportunistically  covering  up evidence  of
banking  trouble and engaging  in costly  regulatory  forbearance  is a rational  managerial  response
when safety-net  officials  derive  reputational  and personal  benefits  from the strength  of their
political  support. This incentive  conflict  is not easily resolved. Even  a privately  managed  and
funded  deposit-insurance  scheme  enjoys implicit  catastrophic  taxpayer  back-up. This means  that
formal  privatization  efforts are never complete. The taxpayer  remains  a silent  partner  whose
stake in implicit  guarantees  is both unfunded  and unlikely  to be formally  acknowledged  by the
fund's managers. Unless  regulatory  decisions  take place in a MTMD  environment  for taxpayers,
no practical  way exists  to make safety-net  managers  fully accountable  in a timely manner  for
managing  taxpayers' economic  stake in the safety  net.
Taxpayers'  stake consists of the value of the support  they  provide  by explicitly  and
implicitly  backing  up the obligations  of whatever  government  guarantees  exist. In the absence of
taxpayer  back-up,  private and government  deposit-insurance  managers  would  have to expend
additional  resources  each year to convince  their fund's counterparties  that the managers  can be
relied upon to fulfill  their contractual  commitments  (Merton  and Perold, 1993). The capitalized
value of this incremental  reduction  in expenses  may  be defined as the "risk capital"  taxpayers
contribute  to the deposit-insurance  system. Unless  taxpayer-contributed  risk capital  earns  a fair
market  return, deposit-insurance  schemes  end up subsidizing  bank risk-taking.
Whenever  the informational  environment  makes it practicable,  it is desirable  to make
specific  officials  responsible  for measuring  the aggregate  losses  to which  the safety  net exposes
taxpayers  and to price and manage  this exposure  appropriately.  However,  especially  in
environments  where  reliable information  is scant  and corruption  is rampant,  adopting  explicit
deposit  insurance  with nominal  coverage  limits  may expand  implicit  guarantees  and short-circuit
imperfect,  but socially  beneficial  depositor  discipline  on bank risk-taking. In the long run, such
societies  are apt to pay a high price for substituting  unaccountable  government  supervision  for
value-driven  private supervision.
Three Ways  to Improve  Accountability
To guard against  unhappy  results,  political  independence  for safety-net  officials  is not
enough. A country  moving  to explicit deposit  insurance  would  be well-advised  to incorporate
design features  that promise  to generate  helpful  private  discipline  on safety-net  managers  and
24bankers alike.  Broadly speaking, economists have identified three such design features.
Although each of these features can improve supervisory incentives at the margin, none of them
offers taxpayers enough transparency or deterrency to make safety-net managers fully
accountable for the consequences of their disciplinary strategies and procedures.  For this reason,
safety-net designers should plan to deploy all three approaches in tandem.
1.  Improved Public-Service Contracting
The first design feature is both more straightforward and less practicable than the other
two.  It focuses on strengthening the contractual incentives of government officials to intervene
in the affairs of every troubled bank before the bank can impose a loss on the insurance fund.
Unless informational and ethical integrity have evolved to a critical level, this is unlikely to be a
feasible policy strategy.  Until managerial rewards for good performance and penalties for bad
performance can be tied to reliable and observable indexes of the ongoing quality of safety-net
management, it is hard to see how to formulate an enforceable incentive-based contract.
This underscores once more the central role transparency plays in safety-net design.  It
tells us that a good starting point for improving public-service contracts for bank regulators is to
insist that authorities take steps to make bank risk more visible to outsiders.  In particular, a
positive obligation might be placed on banks to compile marked-to-market estimates of bank
capital positions and to report promptly all material changes in individual-bank risk exposures
and capital to regulators. Alternatively, banks that do not make mark-to-market could be
required to hold substantially higher levels of accounting capital and to be subject to particularly
severe penalties for failing to disclose material adverse information.
Once such information became available, government regulators could be obliged to
calculate in a reproducible manner how events affect the opportunity-cost value of deposit-
insurance risk exposures in individual banks and to intervene promptly in the affairs of
overextended banks to resolve their capital shortage in a market-mimicking manner.
Accountability for these activities could be established by having regulators' calculations closely
audited by a multinational private accounting firm and by offering top regulators' in each
country deferred compensation that is expressly tied to annual movements in the net unreserved
value of implicit and explicit deposit-insurance exposures. This compensation would be
forfeited by the members of any management team whose calculations are discredited by
subsequent events. Fostering an information framework that makes government officials more
25accountable  would  have  the additional  value of making strategies  for privatizing  some  of the
safety net work more  effectively.
2.  Extended  Liability
The second  design feature  seeks  to curtail the benefits that stockholders  of insolvent
banks and other  financial  institutions  can receive  from engaging  in go-for-broke  risk-taking.
This can be done by extending  stockholder  liability  for liquidation  losses  beyond  the level of the
paid-in capital  accumulated  at the corporate  level. Historically,  several  now-industrialized
countries  (including  the U.S.)  imposed  extended  liability  on bank shares  when their banking
systems were still rudimentary.
For deposit  insurers,  extended  liability  has the advantage  of increasing  transparency,
deterrency,  and accountability  at the same  time. It increases  transparency  by transforming
movements  in the stock  price of publicly  held  banks into a clearer  signal of developing  strength
or weakness. As compared  to a limited-liability  shareholding,  the deterrency  comes  from
stockholders'  duty to pony up additional  funds if (but only if) managers  and regulators  allow the
bank to become  so insolvent  that it passes into liquidation. For this reason,  an extended-liability
obligation  would  barely  affect  the stock  price of a well-managed  and adequately  capitalized
bank. However,  with extended  liability,  the insurer's right to liquidate  an insolvent  bank carries
a put option that lets it collect  a designated  amnount  of personal  assets from every  bank
stockholder. Stock  markets  would  imbed  the value of this option into the price of each bank's
shares. The value of the option  would  be negligible  for banks that were performing  well and
adequately  supporting  their risk with enterprise  capital. However,  the put would  become
increasingly  valuable  when and as a bank took poorly supported  risks or fell into serious  trouble.
Moreover,  in environments  where  the chance that stock-market  participants  might over-react  to
bad news is strong,  the deterrent  effect  of extended liability  would  be particularly  forceful. By
increasing  the sensitivity  of bank stock  prices to changes in bank earning  power and earnings
volatility,  extended  liability  would  encourage  information-revealing  stockholder  runs on troubled
banks well in advance  of their deterioration  to zombie condition. These stock  sell-offs  would
protect  depositors  by helping  safety-net  managers  to identify  institutions  that deserve  increased
supervisory  attention  long before  the enterprise-contributed  capital  of these institutions  could  be
exhausted.
Extended  liability  also increases  accountability. This is because  adverse stock  price
movements  put public  pressure  on regulators  to investigate  and take remedial  action. They  also
26raise the news value to the financial press of reporting regularly upon regulatory actions and their
effects.  To make sure that extended-liability assessments can be collected promptly from failed-
bank stockholders, it would be reasonable for authorities to require stockholders to bond their
extended-liability obligation by depositing a pool of relatively liquid earning assets in a collateral
account at the central bank.  Where appropriate, this account might impose some kind of
currency hedge and even be held in safekeeping at the insured institution.  It is important to see
that neither transparency nor deterrency requires that the particular assets in the collateral pool be
frozen.  Stockholders could be free to move individual assets into and out of the pool over time
as long as settlement float is avoided and the aggregate market value of the collateral account can
be continuously verified.  Just as in an ordinary margin account, if the total value of the pool falls
below a specified threshold value, it must be promptly replenished.  If it is not, the custodian
must be empowered to force the sale of the securities involved.
For any economy that ranks low in informational and ethical integrity, extended liability
is an elegant solution to the problem of deposit-insurance risk-shifting.  This is precisely why it
promises to be difficult to build an effective political constituency for it. Bank stockholders will
resist the efforts to narrow their risk-shifting option and in many countries, regulators will be
reluctant to acknowledge the relevance of the side payments that limited liability generates for
them.  Still, extended liability provides a way of driving an observable market-driven wedge
between the economic interests of ethical and unethical bankers.  It can be framed most
persuasively as an alternative to more intrusive government supervision of bank activity and as a
strategy that would have little impact on banks that manage to stay healthy.
3.  Selective Privatization
The third design feature is to privatize "appropriate" parts of the insurance fund's
aggregate loss exposure in three potentially complementary ways.  Doing this would
simultaneously privatize the monitoring and loss-control responsibilities that attach to these
particular positions.
a.  Private-Public Insurance Partnerships
The first approach is to establish in countries that choose explicit deposit insurance a
private-public partnership in loss control.  The partnership would seek to assign the government
only the catastrophic risk and the particular loss control functions that are associated with
bearing catastrophic risk. An immediate problem in implementing this scheme is to find ways to
separate catastrophic risks from the privately insurable risks that private parties in a given society
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establish just how satisfactorily the insurance functions they propose to transfer could be
managed in the private sector in a crisis environment.
The private deposit insurers would technically function as "sureties."  They would act as
third-party guarantors that bond particular deposit obligations that an insured bank offered its
customers.  The deposit-insurance law would insist that banks contract with a private surety to
accept responsibility for absorbing the first "X" thousand dollars of losses that accrue to any
deposit account if the bank were liquidated.  This responsibility would lead private sureties to
take over the first line of examination and loss control at every insured deposit institution.
Government officials would become managers of what may be characterized as an "overline"
insurer.  This layering would leave officials responsible for reviewing and ratifying the
capitalization and loss-control strategies of each authorized private surety.  The result would be
that, except during a phase-in period and to test the monitoring performance of individual
sureties, govermnent authorities wouldn't regularly examine individual banks.  The private
sureties would be examined and supervised by the government insurer to contain two
catastrophic risks: (1) that one or more private sureties could not cover their obligations to
depositors and (2) that losses in insured institutions could become large enough to exceed the
maximum value of private coverage.
The privatization plan put forward in Kane (1992) has six basic elements.  First, insured
deposit institutions would be required to carry a minimum layer of private insurance.  Second,
insured institutions could contract for amounts above the minimum, but would be required to
publicize this fact.  Third, an insured institution could offer any and all services for which an
authorized carrier was willing to underwrite the pass-through risk during the bonding contract's
specified period of coverage.  Fourth, if at the expiration of the surety bond the carrier was
unwilling to renew at least the minimum coverage, the deposit institution would have only three
choices:  to improve its risk profile to re-qualify itself for coverage; to find another carrier; or to
be declared in default and taken over by authorities who would be responsible for liquidating or
reprivatizing the bank in a cost-effective manner.  Fifth, although individual sureties might
operate in many countries, to assure transparency, authorized carriers would have to be
organized as publicly traded single-line entities and required to issue an array of publicly traded
bills and bonds whose maturity structure would encourage market participants to assess their risk
exposures and loss-control systems at regular intervals.  Finally, each private surety would itself
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surety's operations would have to be communicated regularly to the government overseer in each
country in which the surety operates.  If authorities judge that the surety's reserves have fallen to
an inadequate level, prompt recapitalization would be required for it to continue operating as a
deposit surety in that country.
To reduce the social costs of deposit insurance, the private surety must be designed to
produce stronger incentives to monitor and deter inappropriate bank risk-taking than a
government surety would face in the same informational and contracting environment.
Privatizing monitoring and disciplinary functions transforms -but does not eliminate-the
incentive conflicts that lead government officials to cover up silent runs and to underdiscipline
troubled banks (Aspinwall, 1992). Irrespective of whether a surety is publicly or privately
owned, its managers are partners in banks' risk-taking outcomes.  Surety managers are going to
worry that revealing or openly responding to adverse information about client banks may trigger
depositor runs and crises for which the surety will have to absorb blame.  This gives each surety
an incentive to overlook and hide deficiencies at large institutions.
However, a critical difference exists in the strength of this incentive at private and
government entities.  Without access to unpriced taxpayer risk capital, private managers must
fund at least some of their losses explicitly.  Managers of a government insurance fund can better
conceal the costs of offering inappropriate forbearances to insolvent clients and even to its
partner sureties.  Except in open crisis, it is virtually impossible for outsiders to associate
incremental changes in the cost of financing government debt with changes in the performance
of a particular government enterprise.  To complete the scheme, the back-up government
catastrophic-risk insurer should be required to have outstanding stock and bonds (Kane, 1992;
Wall, 1997). The market value of these securities would be sensitive to outside estimates of
changes in the firm's operating costs and financial condition.  As Kane (1992, pp. 71-72)
explains:
[W]henever poor or self-interested management allows a private surety's
loss exposure to begin to overwhelm its gross reserves, two corrective forces
come into play.  First, the surety's guarantees become increasingly less credible.
This causes the demand for its services to fall. It also increases the intensity of
the regulatory scrutiny it receives from private rating agencies and state insurance
commissioners.  Second, since a fall in demand makes the surety's earnings
decline, the market value of the surety's stock and outstanding guarantees
decrease also.  The decline in stock price creates pressure for the corporation's
stockholders and creditors to press for better management and for outside parties
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It is important to see that, in informationally efficient financial markets, these
forces would exert themselves irrespective of accounting tricks that permit the
managers of a private surety to keep their firm's financial weakness from being
formally reported in its balance sheets and income statements.
These market forces cannot operate dependably in information-poor environments. They
require liquid capital markets in which traders can reap large rewards from researching each
private surety's financial condition, contracting protocols, loss-control policies, and denials of
coverage.  Implementing this design feature begins with identifying particular firms that might
be willing to invest sufficient amounts of capital to operate a surety efficiently. Although
bonding activity has been a traditional province of insurance companies, Ely (1986) has long
argued that large banks are in a good position to sponsor sureties.  However, in most low-income
and middle-income countries, financial markets are not highly competitive. In such
circumstances, if explicit deposit insurance exists, it makes considerable sense for surety bonding
to be underwritten largely by reputable foreign financial firms.  This would allow each surety to
diversify individual-country risks and would constrain the ability of politicians in particular
countries to interfere covertly with the surety's monitoring and disciplinary efforts.
Still, no one should suppose that a public-private deposit-insurance partnership can be
made solid enough to eliminate the threat of financial crises.  In a world in which technology and
science regularly devalue old ways of doing things, a succession of previously profitable
enterprises are bound to become inefficient and have to be shut down.  When the plug is pulled,
institutions that have lent money to these enterprises will be asked to absorb some of their
accumulated losses. The purpose of the partnership structure is to contain financial losses as far
as possible to people and institutions that volunteer explicitly to put themselves in harm's way.
Holding these volunteers accountable for engaging in loss-control activity should reduce the
chance that financial-industry losses will pass through to a country's taxpayers who never meant
-nor in any way wanted-to  be saddled with responsibility for losses.
b.  Subordinated Debt
Without formally introducing private sureties, it is still possible to shift some of the same
responsibility for monitoring and disciplining bank risk-taking to private parties.  The central
goal of the second approach is to create a tier of bank debt that stands between depositors and
stockholders and to keep the tier thick enough to absorb whatever losses the bank might
experience.  The protective tier of debt is said to be "subordinated" to deposits, because
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any funds until depositors have been paid off in full.
To protect its stake in the bank, a subordinated debtholder has a strong incentive to
negotiate covenants that give it the capacity to monitor the bank and to limit the extent to which
bank risk-taking exposes the debtholder to loss.  Once a firm decides to use subordinated debt,
stockholders have an incentive to minimize interest cost by accepting appropriate covenants
(Smith and Warner, 1979).
Still, in many respects, reliance on subordinated debtholders and private sureties raise
similar economic and bureaucratic issues. In both cases, private securities are being created with
the intention of letting their changing market values publicly signal bank weakness in timely
fashion.  In both cases, difficulties in renewing the private contract can force a bank to reduce its
risk-taking or be closed. In both cases, the likelihood of depositor runs is reduced by the
knowledge that private loss absorbers have incentives to close or recapitalize the bank before
losses can grow large enough to reach the depositors.
Both plans make similar demands on banks and government regulators.  Banks have to
offer sufficient transparency and deterrency to persuade investors to put enough capital into these
plans to provide the protection depositors need.  To make sure this happens, government
regulators have to set, monitor and enforce requirements on sureties and subordinated
debtholders.  They must also avoid bailing out troubled banks and the designated loss absorbers.
The central difference between the two plans is that a debtholder invests in the bank at
the outset, while a surety does not have to pay out money unless and until an insured bank fails.
However, because a surety must accumulate enough assets to keep its promises credible, the
difference between the two approaches lies more in the concentration of monitoring
responsibilities and supporting investments in a single entity.
Promising subordinated-debt plans have been put forward by Wall (1988) and Calomiris
(1997).  Both plans envision that banks be formally required to meet a government-set minimum
ratio of subordinated debt to either total or risk-weighted assets.
Wall's plan would allow subordinated debtholders to request redemption of their debt at
any time, but be forced to wait 90 days for reimbursement.  To fend off closure, the bank would
have to use this 90-day window to replace the debt being redeemed or to raise new funds from
stockholders sufficient to pay the debt off.  Banks choosing the second option would receive
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requirement.
Calomiris focuses his plan on making sure that the subordinated debtholders will remain
a reliable source of discipline when and as a country's banking system weakens.  His proposal
follows Benston et al. (1986) in requiring a "laddering" of maturities to assure frequent market
testing of each bank's risk exposures. He would also make subordinated debt nontradable and
limit ownership to a group of pre-approved holders that a country's  government would certify to
be both sufficiently well-capitalized and independent of the issuing bank.  Looming large on the
roster of eligible debtholders would be global banks.  Introducing a "prequalifying" process
makes the subordinated-debt proposal very closely resemble the surety arrangement.  The
differentiating feature lies in linking government supervisory discipline to the observable yield at
which the debt is issued.  Calomiris recommends that authorities deny banks the right to roll over
subordinated debt at a yield that would exceed an appropriately country-specific maximum
allowable yield spread (say, 5%) over Treasury instruments of comparable maturity.  To meet
their subordinated-debt requirement, banks from whom higher yields are being demanded would
have to cut back their risk.
VII.  Crisis Management
When a safety net fails in a circus, managers face a multidimensional disaster: at least
one dead or badly broken acrobat, a shocked and grieving staff, a panicked crowd of traumatized
spectators, and a mess that needs to be contained and cleaned up before it can escalate into a
catastrophe. Unless staffmembers have been carefully drilled in efficient techniques for
containing and cleaning up such a crisis, they are unlikely to prioritize and coordinate their
activities in the best interests of the circus or the audience.
When a country's financial safety net actually breaks down or threatens to break down,
equally pressing problems of priority and coordination arise.  The first line of crisis management
is an unstinting program of preventive inspection, testing, and prompt repair.  In bank
supervision, as in so many other areas of human endeavor, an ounce of protection is worth a
proverbial pound of cure. As we have emphasized, a program of breakdown prevention has two
parts.  It begins with policies that extract reliable information on a bank's risk exposures and on
the ability of its stockholders and uninsured creditors to cover these exposures.  It concludes with
protocols for regulatory response that commit policymakers to employ the information collected
32to make sure that capital shortages and excessive risk exposures at individual banks are corrected
promptly and equitably.
It must be recognized that banks have strong incentives to circumvent the prevention
system.  Whenever a country's prevention program fails to contain this circumvention, a number
of banks go splat.  Crisis management means resolving the insolvency of damaged banks.
Insolvency resolution determines who loses what when the net worth of many banks is wiped out
at the same time.  For authorities to work through a banking disaster efficiently, they must
establish a set of reasonable policy priorities in advance and commit themselves to pursuing
these priorities in the event.  The first priorities are rescue and triage.  Dead and injured
institutions must be sorted out immediately and cared for appropriately.  The second priority is
crowd control. Evidence that triage is being handled efficiently should help to curtail panicky
audience runs, but specific staffinembers must take up the task of helping those who want to take
deposits out of their banks to do so in a reasoned and orderly manner.  The third priority is to
clean up the mess so that the show may resume without an undue delay.
Rescue and Triage
Rather than extend the circus metaphor, it is better to compare the job of managing a
systemic banking crisis to the task of coping with the sudden collapse of a tall building that
produces an overwhelming number of dead and injured parties.  In a systemic banking crisis, the
casualties are the stockholders, employees, depositors, and nondeposit creditors of a nation's
banks. Authorities cannot be expected to find and treat individual casualties efficiently unless
that have formulated an integrated disaster plan and drilled appropriate personnel in its
execution.  The trick is to prepare regulatory staffs to react immediately to the first signs of crisis
without having to wait for specific directions from above.
Bank examiners must have access to the data and expertise to size the depth of emerging
insolvencies promptly.  Supervisory personnel must be divided into teams that are trained to
determine for every individual institution that suffers an insolvency-revealing run the degree of
help that the institution's various stakeholders would require to make them whole.  Without this
information, higher officials cannot evaluate the reasonableness of asking taxpayers to supply
that help.
Supervisors must be conditioned to regard as moribund stockholders' position in any
bank that is too far gone to have any prospects of repaying a taxpayer loan.  It is easy to see that
it makes no sense in the midst of an emergency to divert limited surgical resources to sewing up
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trained to recognize that in dealing with hopelessly insolvent institutions it makes no sense to
open the public purse to preserve the positions of stockholders and subordinated creditors or to
keep paying top managers lofty salaries.
Insured depositors should be granted access to their funds as soon as it is administratively
possible and uninsured depositors should be accorded a fair degree of immediate fractional
access to their funds. Procedures for setting the transactable fraction of different deposit
accounts should be founded in conservative valuation techniques whose application is carefully
rehearsed in advance.  Examiners should be trained to estimate the minimum percentage of
uninsured deposits that could be recovered in an orderly liquidation of the bank's tangible
portfolio. The rest of each depositor's balance should be set aside and unfrozen in stages as the
depth and intangible elements of each bank's insolvency can be more accurately sized. How
fully the positions of other uninsured creditors should be marked down (or "haircut") depends on
the depth of - and margin for error in-the  loss assessments that the examination team is able to
assemble.
Just as in a building collapse, urgent decisions must be made quickly.  However, this
means that authorities must decide ahead of time what decisions, though necessary, are best
postponed to a more convenient time.  In any medical disaster, making decisions about the
urgency of treating different patients is called triage.  Triage begins with assessing the extent of
each casualty's particular needs.  The first objective of this assessment is to determine which
parties are and are not beyond help. The second objective is to set priorities for treating those
that can benefit from specific kinds of assistance. At each moment, available medical resources
must be allocated to the particular tasks that promise to do the most good.  This means rushing
into surgery those whose wounds and injuries either are at a life-or-death stage or are apt to
worsen greatly with delay. Nonsurgical (i.e., less scarce) personnel should be assigned the task
of comforting moribund patients and to helping noncritical patients to keep their spirits up while
they wait for treatment.
It is important to understand that, in the midst of an emergency, such decisions cannot
wait for formal ratification by less-informed higher-ups. Although staffjudgments must be
reviewed and criticized later, during an emergency the autonomy of examination teams must be
respected and supported at all levels of the bureaucracy. The difficulty of switching from a
hierarchical structure of cover-your-ass decision-making to a decentralized task-oriented and
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presume that they can work out efficient schemes of disaster management on the fly.
Crowd Control
Using the words "panic" and "depositor runs" to describe the onset of financial crises
tends to build a subliminal case for authorities to mount a rescue without stopping to establish
priorities.  However, one can leamn  a great deal about how to manage a panicky depositor run by
analyzing rigorously the metaphors embodied in these emotive words.
The first lesson is to distinguish efforts to treat a fast-burning panic from the methods that
would be appropriate for addressing the longer-lasting phenomena of a financial crisis.  The
word "panic" is rooted in classical mythology.  Panic comes from the name of the Greek god
Pan.  Pan combined a human torso with a goat's legs, horns, and ears.  Because of his ugliness,
Pan was said to strike sudden and profound terror into the hearts of shepherds and other
wanderers unlucky enough to cross his path.
The triggering ugliness in a bank panic is the murky surfacing of adverse information that
destroys customer confidence in the repayment capacity of a group of banks.  This loss of
confidence may be based either on general information about the consequences of unfolding
economic events or information specific to individual banks or to the particular assets they are
known to hold.
The essence of a banking panic is twofold.  First, in a panic, runs are widespread enough
that affected banks cannot raise funds quickly by selling portfolio assets to other parties at fair
prices.  Second, institutions not experiencing runs are reluctant to lend enough funds to affected
banks to allow them to maintain the convertibility of their deposits into cash.
For authorities, a systemic panic creates an urgent need to deal with a wave of spreading
bank illiquidity and financial dislocation.  However, the urgency of stopping a panic must not be
allowed to over-ride the need to identify hopelessly insolvent zombie institutions and begin the
process of winding up their affairs.  Issuing blanket government loans and guarantees to all
troubled banks implicitly shifts the burden of absorbing the losses imbedded in the portfolios of
zombie institutions to taxpayers and relieves managers, stockholders, and creditors from bearing
due responsibility for the loss-making decisions they had previously ratified contractually.
To end a panic efficiently, liquidity must be offered only to potentially solvent
institutions and control over zombie institutions must be put into new hands.  This means that
authorities must stop to take the measure of a financial institution's wounds before greatly
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assessment timeout, would-be transactors have strong incentives to use standard and innovative
forms of credit to prevent transactions from grinding to a halt.  Credit cards and checks can be
accepted, along perhaps with other documents, as evidence of personal indebtedness whose
collectable value may be supplemented from other sources if the issuing bank falls into
liquidation.
Periods in which the government temporarily dictates that banks shut their door and
suspend the convertibility of their deposits are called, with more than a little irony, "banking
holidays."  The irony lies in the unwelcomeness of the interruption in routine and in how hard
banking and regulatory personnel have to work to bring the holiday to a successful end.
Although the runs metaphor is too vivid to discuss in full, visualizing a panicked banking
system as suffering from the runs underscores the same dilemma.  The dilemma flows from the
idea that the suffering party has inhaled or swallowed some potentially contagious antigen and is
undergoing a lagged but rapid elimination of unhealthful material.  In a crisis, the antigen is a
loss of wealth that must work itself out through the liability side of the balance sheets of troubled
banks.  In designing a treatment plan, it would be a mistake to let the speed of elimination
become the sole consideration. At each moment, the long-run cost of interfering with the
transfer of bank losses to those contractually responsible for financing them must be weighed
against the benefits of bringing the panic to a quicker end.
Three alternative metaphors for understanding and dealing with an unfolding banking
panic can help us to explore the workout process:
1.  a meltdown of financial value
2.  a stampede
3.  epidemic control.
1.  Meltdown: The meltdown metaphor conveys the idea of a sudden annihilation of bank
portfolio value.  This metaphor accommodates the idea that the sudden emergence of adverse
infornation  about borrower prospects or previously hidden bank frauds or losses might seem to
vaporize what once looked like solid asset value.  If the information guiding the metaphorical
"value heat ray" is accurate, the ray ought to make slag only out of banks and assets that are truly
"junk."  A well-aimed ray can clear the road for future economic growth by seeking out and
vaporizing society's garbage. As did the stampede metaphor, the meltdown conception identifies
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limiting industry exits and takeovers to institutions that truly warrant failure.
2.  Stampede: Bank customers who are running a bank are trying to mitigate their individual
exposure to loss. In this respect, they resemble a herd of animals that has been stampeded by the
appearance of a pack of predators. In the animal kingdom, such stampedes (e.g., of moose
responding to the appearance of hungry wolves) help to cull the herd by letting the quick and the
nimble escape and offering up the slow and the lame for the predator's dinner.  Hence, the
stampede metaphor introduces the important entailment that a bank run is a mechanism that
identifies and eliminates weak and infirm banks: a winnowing process that exemplifies the
Schumpeterian ideal of "creative destruction."  The deadweight social cost of the winnowing
process is the damage customer credit relationships suffer at institutions whose affairs are
reorganized or liquidated.
Allowing ownership claims on insolvent banks to expire when they become valueless is
necessary for banking markets to function appropriately.  Schumpeterian economic theory
emphasizes the practical wisdom -a wisdom that is celebrated in hunting and warrior cultures-
that life springs from death. Joseph Campbell (1972, pp. 176-178) clarifies that, in simpler times
than ours, myths and ceremonies taught generation after generation of their members that to
activate life one kills.  The root idea is that life and value do not come into the world, they come
"out" of it.  Dead things are transformed biologically into nutrients (and economically into object
lessons), which means that nothing and nobody dies in vain.
A depositor run creates incentives that reward customers and other financial firms for
helping to gather information that analysts can use to judge which banks are and are not strong
enough to deserve an inflow of liquidity-enhancing loans and deposits.  Institutions and
individuals who make well-reasoned loan and deposit decisions will earn attractive returns; those
who make bad decisions should not be bailed out by blanket guarantees.
3.  Epidemic Control:  The possibility that customer fear and confusion might result in
unwarranted value destruction brings us to the public-policy metaphor of "contagion control."
Contagion occurs when an infection is transmitted from a diseased individual to a previously
uninfected party (Schwartz, 1999). It differs radically from circumstances in which two parties
have ingested a common poison (i.e., bad loans).
Any epidemic spread of confusion per se can and should be countered by micro and
macro policies.  Macro control may be effected by avoiding contractionary monetary policies
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policies may be likened to raising shields to blunt the destructive power of a heat ray, eliminating
predators, or using vaccination programs to block the spread of germs.
All three metaphors sound the theme that policy action should reinforce triage activity
and not counteract it.  Micro policy measures should enlist nongovernmental parties in the tasks
of identifying likely survivors and of focusing liquidity assistance on them.  The planning and
design question is to make sure that, in judging which banks and assets deserve to be shielded
from spreading harm, authorities establish ways to make use of the analytic capacities of
nongovermnental entities, customers, local clearinghouses, and foreign banks.
Keeping the Exits Open
The idea that regulators should keep some exits open for depositors is a metaphor for
creating a supervisory environment that minimizes the impact of bank crises on the nation's
aggregate money supply.  The most straightforward way to preserve the liquidity of bank
depositors is to assure insured and uninsured customers that arrangements are being made to let
them directly or indirectly borrow central-bank funds against the collateral of their recoverable
net claim on each insolvent bank.  Preparing examiners to calculate promptly the value at which
bank assets could be liquidated in an orderly manner is the key step in assuring that access to
depositor funds will be restored reasonably promptly.
Once examiners have made these quick-and-dirty calculations, depositors can be granted
fractional access to the funds in their accounts. At the same time, the government should
establish a formal claim on the equity of each insolvent bank either by completely extinguishing
the rights of former shareholders or by taking a warrant position large enough to compensate
taxpayers for the administrative and risk-bearing costs of overseeing the bank's recapitalization.
In either case, the aim would be to sell the government's equity claim to private parties as soon
as fully reliable information on asset values can be developed.
Banking regulators are unlikely to engage in disaster planning unless they acknowledge
that neither systemic banking crises nor banking holidays are unthinkable events.  Banking crises
are part of a repeating cycle of bank lending to parties whose ability to repay cannot be fully
assessed in advance.  A banking panic typically occurs when previously hidden weaknesses in
borrowers' repayment capacity surface suddenly. The depth of borrower weakness tells us that
large losses need to be allocated across those who hold the liabilities that now-troubled banks
38issued in the process of funding what, with the benefit of hindsight, everyone now sees to have
been loss-making activities.
It is unreasonable to expect risky bank lending to generate an endless string of success
stories.  It is equally unreasonable to suppose that having no alternative to keeping stakeholders
in deeply insolvent banks from paying for their mistakes is a desirable public policy.  The
fundamental question in a crisis is what parts of society should wield the hammer and what parts
should be made to act as anvil.
Banks that inefficiently manage their resources destroy their ownership capital.  This loss
of capital should unleash market forces that serve to transfer the valuable parts of such a bank's
franchise into better capitalized and potentially more skillful hands.  In our softhearted modem
times, industry spin doctors try to convince taxpayers that closing an insolvent bank or assigning
its business to a new owner is a barbarously cruel thing to do. Unless creditors and investors
expect inefficient managers and undercapitalized firms to be promptly and appropriately
disciplined, the incentives that govern the evaluation and selection of risky investment projects
will break down. This is why society must find ways to reward banking regulators for
formulating and enforcing meaningful capital requirements and must pound regulators that dare
to keep zombie banks in play.
Regulators who choose not to develop a plan for allocating losses in a disaster must be
held accountable for inefficiencies that emerge in their inevitably hasty and ad hoc response to
crisis pressures. During the last 60 years, shortsighted regulators have prototypically acted first
and thought about it later.  By and large, they have justified the costs of this ad hockery by
framing crisis situations as so unique and so dire that indiscriminate use of government
guarantees and bailout support serve the public interest not only in the short run, and also over
the longer haul. It is hard to understand why taxpayers accept the lack of accountability for the
projectable future budgetary costs and long-run incentive distortion that this characterization
conveys.
Crises are not unique events, nor are they isolated in time from the events that precede
and follow them. On average, the faster and more fairly an insolvent banking system's losses
can be allocated, the quicker socially desirable patterns of bank lending can resume. The more
efficiently and more fairly the process of loss resolution can be conducted, the smaller the bill in
economic resources and social demoralization that taxpayers will have to pay to make the
banking system whole again.
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Banks  are in the business  of taking risk. These risks originate  in the real economy. By
intermediating  the flow of real savings  and real investment,  banks evaluate  and monitor  the
quality of individual  borrowers. They also provide  customers  with ways  to avoid  some  or all of
the ultimate  responsibility  for bearing the risks the banks approve.
Accumulating  stockholder  equity is a way for individual  banks to bond  the quality  of
their monitoring  and evaluating  activity,  but it is not the only way. In particular,  because
governments  have an interest both in the efficient allocation  of national  savings  and in limiting
the damage  bank risk-taking  may  visit on other parties, governments  inevitably  supply  taxpayer
risk capital  to their banking  system  by erecting  and managing  a financial  safety  net.
We take it as a rule of thumb that safety-net  managers  should  avoid either  subsidizing  or
taxing bank risk-taking.  Economic  research  has never established  that taxing or subsidizing
private  risk-taking  is an optimal  way to run a nation's economy. Even if analysts  could
formulate  a beneficial  tax or subsidy  rule, it is unlikely  that channeling  the effect through  a
government-run  deposit  insurance  system  that fails  to account  publicly  for the size of taxpayers'
stake could  improve  upon more straightforward  arrangements.
A country's safety  net is unlikely  to be optimal  unless  it establishes  or maintains
transparency,  deterrency,  and accountability. This paper shows  that large  differences  exist
across  countries  in the transparency  and deterrency  that banks afford  their depositors. It also
shows  why safety-net  design  needs  to take these differences  into account.
The weaker  is a country's informational,  ethical,  and corporate-governance  environment,
the more a wholly  governmental  system of explicit  deposit  guarantees  is apt to undermine  bank
safety  and stability. Put positively,  the design features  and operating  protocols  of a country's
safety  net ought  to evolve  over time with changes  in private and government  regulators'  capacity
for valuing  banking  institutions,  for disciplining  risk-taking  and resolving  insolvencies  promptly,
and (above  all) for being held accountable  for how well they perform  these  tasks.
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43FIGURE 1
BEST PRACTICES FOR SAFETY-NET DESIGN ENVISIONED
BY IMF RESEARCHERS
All Countries Should Establish Explicit Deposit Insurance
The Insurance  System  Should  Incorporate  at Least  the Following
Design  Features:
- Prudential regulation
- Limitations on coverage
- Mandatory membership
- Political "independence" for regulatory officials.
44FIGURE  2
CROSS-COUNTRY  TREND IN THE ADOPTION  OF EXPLICIT  DEPOSIT  INSURANCE
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Note:  Countries that have adopted deposit insurance that are not in the sample we analyzed are: Bahrain, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Central African Rep.,
Chad, Congo, Croatia, Czech Rep., Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Gabon, Gibraltar, Hungary, Latvia, Lebanon,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Tanzania, Uganda, UkraineTABLE  1
MEASURES  OF CROSS-COUNTRY  VARIATION  IN THE
QUALITY  OF ECONOMIC  INFORMATION
Accounting  Corruption  Index of  Accounting  Corruption  Index of
Standards  Index  Restrictions  Standards  Index  Restrictions
on Press  on Press
High Income  (continued)
Australia  75  5.11  8.8  South Africa  70  5.35  30.6
Austria  54  5.14  14.6  Trinidad &  1.80  27.6
Belgium  61  5.29  8.8  Tobago
Canada  74  6.00  15.2  Uruguay  31  3.00  38.6
Cyprus  2.60  21.2  Venezuela  40  2.82  35
Denmark  62  6.00  9.4
Finland  77  6.00  15.4  Middle Lower
France  69  5.43  25.6  Bolivia  1.35  18.4
Germany  62  5.36  14.4  Botswana  2.30  27.4
Greece  55  4.36  28.4  China  2.55  83.8
Hong Kong  69  5.11  32.75  Colombia  50  3.00  52.2
Iceland  3.60  12.4  Costa Rica  3.00  17.4
Ireland  5.11  17.8  Ecuador  3.11  36.4
Israel  64  5.00  29.2  Egypt  24  2.32  75
Italy  62  3.68  27.8  Indonesia  1.29  71.4
Japan  65  5.11  20.2  Jamaica  1.40  14.8
Korea  62  3.18  26.4  Jordan  3.29  50.6
Luxembourg  3.60  10.4  Morocco  1.80  52.4
Netherlands  64  6.00  14.8  Namibia  2.60  27.2
New Zealand  70  6.00  6.8  Panama  1.20  27.8
Norway  74  6.00  6.6  Peru  38  2.82  58
Portugal  36  4.43  17  Philippines  65  1.75  44.6
Singapore  78  4.93  63.6  Sri Lanka  3.00  46.8
Spain  64  4.43  18  Thailand  64  3.11  39.8
Sweden  83  6.00  10.2  Tunisia  1.80  67.4
Switzerland  68  6.00  9.2  Turkey  51  3.11  68
Taiwan  65  4.11  28.4
United Kingdom  78  5.46  22.2  Low Income
United States  71  5.18  12.8  Bangladesh  0.85  52.8
Cote d'Ivoire  2.30  69.2
Middle-Upper  Ghana  1.95  61.2
Income  Honduras  1.20  45.6
Argentina  45  3.61  31.2  India  57  2.75  42.4
Brazil  54  3.79  29.8  Kenya  2.89  59.2
Chile  52  3.18  29  Nigeria  59  1.82  80.8
Malaysia  76  4.43  61  Pakistan  1.79  57.8
Mexico  60  2.86  54.4  Zimbabwe  3.25  56.2
Accounting  Standards:  Index  created  by examining  and rating companies'  1990  annual  reports  on their inclusion  or omission
of 90 items. These  items  fall into  7 categories  (general  information,  income  statements,  balance  sheets,  funds  flow
statement,  accounting  standards,  stock  data  and special  items). A minimum  of 3 companies  in each country  were studied.
The companies  represent  a cross-section  of various  industry  groups  of which  70%/o  are industrial  companies  and 30%/O  are
financial  firms. Higher  scores  indicate  better  accounting  standards. (Source:  International  Accounting  andAuditing Trends,
Centerfor  International  Financial  Analysis  & Research,  Inc.)
Corruption:  ICR's assessment  of corruption  in government. Lower  scores  indicate  "high government  officials  are likely  to
demand  special  payments"  and "illegal  payments  are generally  expected  throughout  the lower  levels  of government"  in the
form of "bribes  connected  with import  and export  licenses,  exchange  controls,  tax, assessment,  policy  protection,  or loans".
Scale  runs from 0 to 6, with lower  scores  indicating  higher  levels of corruption.  (Source:  International  Country  Risk Guide)
Restrictions  on Press:  Assessment  of repressive  actions  and laws,  regulations,  controls,  and political  pressures  that influence
media  content. Score  reported  is  the average  index assigned  by Freedom  House  staff in Annual  Press  Freedom  Reports,
1994-1998.  Scale  runs from 0 to 100,  with  lower  scores  indicating  greater  freedom.TABLE 2
TIME  SERIES  OF CROSS-COUNTRY  VARIATION  IN BANKING-SYSTEM
CREDIT-RATING  PROXIES*
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Argentina  14.0  14.0  14.0  14.0  14.0
Australia  3.0  4.1  4.8  4.8  4.8  4.4  4.6  4.2  4.2
Austria  4.0  2.5  2.9  2.9  4.0
Bahrain  12.0  12.0
Bahrain  - Offshore  10.0
Belgium  2.0  3.0  2.9  3.4  3.4  4.0
Bermuda  6.4
Brazil  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0
Canada  3.1  3.1  3.3  3.8  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.7
Chile  9.0  8.5  8.4  8.0
China  7.0  7.0  9.0  8.7  8.8
Colombia  11.0  11.0  11.0
Croatia  11.0
Cyprus  6.0  6.0
Czech Republic  9.1  9.0




Finland  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  6.0
France  1.5  1.7  1.9  2.2  3.0  3.7  4.9  4.8  4.7  4.4
Germany  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.2  1.2  1.6  1.8  1.8  2.1  2.3
Greece  10.0  10.0  8.1
Hong Kong  7.0  7.0  7.2  6.5
Hungary  12.0  11.5
Iceland  7.0
India  11.0  11.0
Indonesia  11.3  13.0
Ireland  5.0  6.0  5.5  5.5  5.1  5.1  5.1  4.7
Israel  7.0  7.0
Italy  2.0  1.9  2.6  4.2  5.5  5.7  6.0  5.9  5.6
Japan  1.7  1.7  2.9  3,7  3.7  6.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  5.8
Jordan  14.0
Kazakhstan  - 15.0
Korea  7.0  7.0  6.8  7.5  7.2  13.7
Kuwait  8.0  8.0
Lebanon  15.0
47TABLE 2 continued
Liechtenstein  4.0  4.0
Luxembourg  4.0  4.0  4.0
Malaysia  5.0  5.3  8.9
Malta  . 6.0
Mauritius  9.0
Mexico  12.0  12.0  14.0  14.0  13.0
Netherlands  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.4  2.5  2.6  2.5
Norway  4.0  4.0  5.0  6.4  7.0  7.0  7.0  6.0  6.1  6.1




Philippines  13.0  12.6  12.7  12.2
Poland  12.1  11.8  11.7
Portugal  6.0  6.0  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.9
Qatar  9.0  9.0
Romania  14.0
Russia  13.0
Saudi Arabia  10.0  10.0
Singapore  3.4  3.5  3.5
Slovakia  11.0  11.0
Slovenia  10.0
South Africa  11.0  1-  -0
Spain  3.5  3.5  4.0  4.2  4.4  4.3  4.3  4.3
Sweden  1.0  1.0  1.0  2.5  4.0  5.5  5.5  5.5  5.5  4.9
Switzerland  1.0  1.0  2.0  2.7  2.7  2.6  3.1  3.2
Taiwan  4.0  5.2  5.9
Thailand  6.0  6.8  7.1  13.8
Tunisia  11.0  11.0
Turkey  10.0  14.0  14.0  14.0  15.0
United Arab Emirates  8.6  8.6
United Kingdom  2.0  2.2  2.8  3.5  3.6  3.6  3.5  3.4  3.5  3.3
United States  6.0  4.7  4.0  4.9  5.2  5.2  4.8  4.6  4.5  4.3  3.9
o.  All ratings are assigned in the year shown.  Except for the U.S., proxy values are weighted averages (using
asset weights) of Moody's Long-Term Deposit Ratings of Non-US banks operating in a country. Banks
with no LT-Deposit Ratings, and relatively smaller banks are not included in the sample; this is why the
averages are labelled as "proxies".  Ratings were assigned the numerical values shown in the following
table:
i  Aaa  Aal  Aa2 I  Aa3 I  Al  I  A2  I  A3  I  Baal  I  Baa2  I  Baa3  Bal  Ba2  I  Ba3  E  Bl  B2  I B3  I  Caal  I Caa2  Caa3 I Ca  C
I1  2  3  1  4  1  5  L6 j  7  8  S  1  9  1  10  I  11  1  12  1  B  1  14  1  15  1  16  17  1  18  1  19  r 20  21il
48TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE  OF BANK ASSETS RATED IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES,  1987 to 1997
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Argentina  12.4  15.0  59.9  63.5  44.4
Australia*  86.3  79.4  78.9  74.7  76.6  82.1  83.6  87.1
Austria  16.5  33.1  32.8  33.9  22.2
Bahrain  67.0  64.9
Belgium  15.3  48.9  50.0  56.6  60.3  44.0
Bermuda
Brazil  5.4  82.7  80.9  91.5
Canada*  74.6  90.5  92.1  90.4  91.0  90.8  94.5  95.4
Chile*  30.3  60.8  62.4  64.2
China  25.4  80.4  78.2  71.4  65.4
Colombia  10.8  54.9  49.7
Croatia  26.6
Cyprus  83.1  85.6
Czech  Republic  68.7  60.0
Denmark  44.2  72.2  67.4  69.9  68.7  75.5  79.9  96.7
Ecuador  38.6
Egypt, Arab Rep.  35.3
Estonia  48.5
Finland  9.5  9.3  10.2  12.7  12.3  62.3  61.4  67.7
France  56.9  59.0  64.8  67.2  65.2  67.2  70.8  70.6
Germany  18.3  23.4  24.2  30.6  31.0  33.5  36.5  40.3
Greece*  90.6  90.4  89.4
Hong Kong,  China  16.9  26.8  33.2  34.0
Hungary
Iceland  28.3
India  50.3  61.0
Indonesia  65.4  20.0
Ireland*  95.5  94.3  86.1  86.9  74.2  62.1  63.7  73.3
Israel*  92.4  93.8
Italy  28.9  27.7  27.7  36.4  67.3  68.2  74.1  71.4
Japan  13.0  14.0  79.7  80.5  77.9  84.2  85.6  86.3  87.0  84.7
Jordan  16.8
Kazakhstan  22.7
Korea, Rep.*  13.4  9.6  34.0  60.8  86.9  89.1
Kuwait  93.7  92.3
Lebanon  22.1
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg  5.9  12.1  12.5
49TABLE 3 continued
Malaysia  33.4  41.4  43.3
Malta  50.9
Mauritius  59.9
Mexico  9.6  13.2  89.2
Morocco  n.a.  n.a.
Netherlands  20.2  20.9  20.0  30.2  32.2  35.3  34.3
Norway  50.5  48.5  45.0  42.4  40.5  40.6  46.5  48.2




Philippines  15.5  73.8  64.9  57.3
Poland  16.9  26.0  22.1
Portugal  14.4  25.5  34.6  49.1  67.7  51.0
Qatar  71.8  70.7
Romania  40.1
Russian  Federation*  23.7
Saudi  Arabia  63.2  56.2
Singapore  90.5  97.2  93.7
Slovak  Republic  66.9  47.2
Slovenia  55.0
South  Africa  93.1  86.5
Spain  17.2  19.3  25.4  59.2  58.9  63.3  67.3  74.4
Sweden  60.1  61.6  62.9  63.9  62.0  72.2  75.9  81.6
Switzerland  44.1  45.6  45.7  58.0  55.7  65.5  78.2  90.6
Taiwan,  China  9.5  30.0  20.1
Thailand  25.1  59.6  71.1  65.4
Tunisia  62.5  6.5
Turkey  25.0  25.9  43.4  86.1  38.2
United  Arab  Emirates  41.3  42.9
United  Kingdom  21.5  23.5  37.4  42.5  41.5  41.6  45.9  46.1
United  States  0.1  0.8  3.8  32.8  33.0  38.1  43.7  51.7  53.5  57.8  55.9
Percentage  of bank assets rated: The  ratio of the total assets  of rated  banks  to a proxy measure  of the banking  systems'  assets.
Notes: The  numerator  is the sum  of the total  assets  of the banks  having  long-term  deposit  credit  ratings  by Moody's  credit  rating
agency.  The  data  source  for the numerator  is the Bankscope  database.  A small  portion  of the rated  banks,  for  which  no asset  size
data  are available,  is excluded  from  the numerator.
The denominator  is a proxy  for  the banking  system's  assets,  and is  calculated  by adding  the 206',  21', and  22nd,  lines  of the
Intemational  Monetary  Fund's  International  Financial  Statistics  (except  for  the countries  with an '*").  Major  aggregates  of the
accounts  on the assets  side  are Reserves  (line 20),  comprising  domestic  currency  holdings  with  the monetary  authorities,  Foreign
Assets  (line 21), and Claims  on Other  Resident  Sectors  (lines  22*).  The denominator  does  not cover  all the assets  of the banks
and therefore  the measure  is downward  biased.  The denominators  of the countries  marked  with  an "*" are calculated  with
BankScope  data  because  using  the IMF  figures  would  produce  a figure  in excess  of 100  percent.
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MEASURES OF CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATION IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
One  Shares  not  Cufnulativ  Opprsse  cap/itl to  AAnb-  Restrictionsforr_NSecurede
share  Proxy  blocked  voting or  minorities  Preernptive  call an  director  Mand;ttory  going into  automatic  creditors  Managernent Creditw  Legal
Enpglish  French  German  Scandinafvian  -owne by mail  before  proportional  mechanism  rights  extraordina  rights  dividend  reorganization  stay on  first  does  not stay  rights  reserve
vote  meeting  representation  ry  secwr.ed
meeting  assets
High Income  __ 
AustrWiaI  0  0  0  I  0  ~  0  0  0  0.0  2  0  i  _-3
Belgium  -1  O0  O  - 0  0  ~  0  0  0  O  0  0.2  0  2  0.1
Canada  I  O  0  0  -O  _  0.05  5  0  O  0  -
Cyprus  I  0  0o  _
Denmark  O  - O  O  O  1  0  O  0.1  2  O  1  3 0._25r
Finland  0  O0  - 0  4  0  0.1  -3  0  0  T  I  -oI 
Fremce  0  -O  0  0  0  0.-51  3  0  ~0  -O  O  o.1
Germany  O  I  ~  0  -O0  0  0  0.05  1  l  10  -3  0  .1
Grec-e  0  0  0  O-  0  0  2  0.05  2  _6.35  ~O0  0  ~  1  03
Icelng  Kong  0  I  0  .l  Xl  00.  5-  -0II  4  0
Iceland  0  0  0  Q  .
Isand  I  0  0  0  0  0  0  . 1  3  01  4  ~0  -I-
Italy  0  0  0  0  0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-  0  0  0.2  -I  0  10  12  02
Japan  0  0  1  1  0  0.03  4  O  0  1  2  025-
Korea  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0.05  2  0  0  I  3  0.5
Tetherlands  ii  -I  O-  O  O  O  O  ~  l.  I  2  O  . O  1O  2  O0
New ~Zealand  I  0  0  0  0  1  O  0.05  4  O-  I  I  -O0  3  0
Norway  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0.1  4-  -~  0  O  2  0 .2
i  ~  ~~~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~  0  0  0  o  I  O  0  0.05  3  OOO  O  0.
Portgapoel  0  3  0  0.  4  0  1  01
Sigpoen  0  0  0  0  0  ~  0.05  0  2 
SweZ  O  O  O  O  D  O  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.15  4  O  I  2  0.2
Switmerlarsd  0  0  O  O  O  0  0  l  0.1  -2  0  0.~  101  -F5
Taiwan  0  . 0  0-  0  oII  3  0  . 0  3  T  o  0  2  1
United  S.,..  I  0  0  0  0  1  0  0.1  5  O  0  0  1  0  I  0
Middle-upper  Income 
Argentina  -O  -I  - 0  -- O  0  . 0  . 0  -o5  4-1o  ~  0  - 0  02
Barao  I_  '  O_
Brail  --  - 3  0.  O  Ol O  O0  O  O  lOO  1-  0.2
Chile  0  1  0  0  1  O  I  I  I  I  0.0  1  5  0.3  1  0  1  0  2  0.2
Malaysia  I  0  0  0  0  0.1  4-  0  l14  0
Mauritius  0  1  0  _ 
1  1  - o  l  o  o  -o  o  o  o  o  l  0  0  0  0.33  0  O  O  0TABLE 4 continued
% ofshar
One  Shares  not  Cumulative  Oppressed  capil  to  Anti-  Restrictions  for  No  Secured
share  Proxy  blocked  voting  or  minorities  Preemptive  call an  director Mandatory  goitng  into  automatic  creditors  Mmtagement Creditor  Legal
English  French  German  Scandinavian  - one  by mail  before  proportional  mecbanism  rights  extraordina rights  dividend  reorganization  stay  on  first  does  not stay  rights  reserve
vote  meeting  reprsentation  _y  secured
Saudi Arabia  m
South  Africa  o  0  0  0  1  1  O  1  O  0  _  _  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Trinidad  & Tobao  I  0  0  0
Srugy  I  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0.2  2  0  0  I  2  0 2
VTnailan  0  0  0  0  0o  -I  1  0  0  0.2  2  0I  1  3  0.
Middkt Lower  ~  __ 
Bolivia  0  I  0  0
Costa Rica  ~  ~0  _  .
Ecuador  I~  ~  ~  ~  ~  0  -0  -0  . IO  0  -0.25  -2  0.5  ll  I4  0.5
Egypt  0  1  0  O  0  -0  1  O  0  .1  -2  I  0  ~  4  0 5
Indonesia  0  1  0  0  0  0  - 1  0  0  0.1  4  2  I  0  2  0
Iran  0  0  0  0  _
hamaica  I  0  0  0
Iordia  0  0  00  1  °  1  1  0°  ;  0.I  1  25  0.
Morocco
Namibia=
Panyma  0  0  0  0
Nigerua  I  0  0  -0  0  I  0  t  0  0.2  3  0  0  10  4  02
Philippines  0  1-1  I  0  )  0  0O  0  _3  . . 0  -0  0  °  °
Sraislan  I  0  0  0  0  O  O  I  _  O  0.1  3  0O  1  O  I  3  0
Thailand ~  ~  ~  ~~~  O  O  0  -O  -O  I  l  0  2  2  O  ~  3-  0.1
Tmunsia  0  I  _  _
Turkey  1  0  0  00T  0  0  0  05  3  0  1  -I0  2  4  0  2
B  a  n  gl  ad  es  h  I  0  0  0  0  I  0  . 14  5
Ghanya  I  0  0  01_°0.3  40
Ncpjal  - 0  . 0  . 0  _  _  . - _~ 
Nigeria  I  o0  0  o-  I  0  0  .1  -3  0  _  lI 
Pak~~~~~~~~i  s  a O  -O  OI-o  I.  I  - 5  -II  4O
Zimbabwe  l~~~~~  0  0  0  0 00I000 
52Legal origin:  Dummy variables that identify the legal origin of the Company Law of Commercial Code of each country.  (English, French, German or Scandinavian).
Foreign Law Encyclopedia Commercial Laws of the World.
One share - one vote: Equals  one if the Company  Law  of Commercial  Code  of the country  requires  that  ordinary  shares  carry  one vote per  share,  and zero otherwise. Equivalently,  this
variable  equals  one when  the law prohibits  the existence  of both multiple-voting  and non-voting  ordinary  shares  and does not allow  firms to set a maximum  number  of votes per
shareholder  irrespective  of the number  of shares  she owns,  and zero otherwise.  Company  Law of Commercial  Code.
Proxy  by mail: Equals  one if the Company  Law  of Commercial  Code  allows  shareholders  to mail  their proxy  vote to the firm,  and zero otherwise.  Company  Law of Commercial  Code.
Share  not blocked  before  meeting:  Equals  one if the Company  Law  of Commercial  Code  does not allow  firms  to require  that shareholders  deposit  their shares  prior to a General
Shareholders  Meeting  thus preventing  them  from selling  those  share  for a number  of days,  and zero  otherwise.  Company  Law of Commercial  Code.
Cumulative  voting  or proportional  representation:  Equals  one if the Company  Law  of Commercial  Code  allows  shareholders  to cast  al of their votes for one candidate  standing  for
election  to the board  of directors  (cumulative  voting)  or if the Company  Law  or Commercial  Code allows  a mechanism  of proportional  representation  in the board  by which  minority
interests  may name  a proportional  number  of directors  to the board,  and zero otherwise.  Company  Law  of Commercial  Code.
Oppressed  minorities  mechanism:  Equals  one if the Company  Law  of Commercial  Code  grants minority  shareholders  either  a judicial  venue  to challenge  the decisions  of management
or of the assembly  or the right to step out of the company  by requiring  the company  to purchase  their shares  when  they  object to certain  fundamental  changes,  such  as mergers,  assets
dispositions  and changes  in the articles  of incorporation.  The variable  equals  zero  otherwise. Minority  shareholders  are defined  as those shareholders  who own 10  percent  of the
share capital  or less.  Company  Law of Commercial  Code.
Preemptive  rights:  Equals  one if the Company  Law  of Commercial  Code  grants shareholders  the first opportunity  to buy  new issues  of stock and this right can only  be waved  by a
shareholders'  vote,  and zero  otherwise.  Company  Law of Commercial  Code.
Percentage  of share  capital  to call an extraordinary  shareholders'  meeting:  It is the minimum  percentage  ownership  of share  capital  that entitled  a shareholder  to call for an
Extraordinary  Shareholders'  Meeting. It ranges  from I to 33 percent.  Company  Law of Commercial  Code.
Anti-director  rights: An index aggregating  the shareholder  rights  labeled  as "anti-director"  rights. The index  is formed  by adding I when:  (I) the country  allows shareholders  to mail
their proxy  vote to the firm; (2) shareholders  are not  required  to deposit  their shares  prior to the General  Shareholders'  Meeting;  (3) cumulative  voting  or proportional  representation
of minorities  in the board  of directors  is allowed;  (4)  an oppressed  minorities  mechanism  is in place;  (5)  the minimum  percentage  of share capital  that entitled  a shareholder  to call for
an Extraordinary  Shareholders'  Meeting  is less than  or equal  to 10  percent  (the  sample  median);  or (6) shareholders  have  preemptive  rights  that can only  be waived  by a shareholders'
vote. The  index  ranges from 0 to 6. Company  Law of Commercial  Code.
Mandatory  dividend:  Equals  the percentage  of net income  that the Company  Law  of Commercial  Code requires  firms  to distribute  as dividends  among  ordinary  stockholders.  It takes  a
value of zero for  countries  without  such restriction.  Company  Law of Commercial  Code.
Restrictions  for going  into  reorganization:  Equals  one if the reorganization  procedure  imposes  restrictions,  such as creditors'  consent,  to file for reorganization.  It equals  zero if there
are no such restrictions.  Bankruptcy  and Reorganization  Laws.
No automatic  stay on secured  assets: Equals  one if the reorganization  procedure  does  not impose  an automatic  stay on the assets of the firm upon filing  the reorganization  petition. An
automatic  stay prevents  secured  creditors  from gaining  possession  of their security. It equals  zero if such restriction  does not exist in the law. Bankruptcy  and Reorganization  Laws.
Secured  creditors  first: Equals  one if secured  creditors  are ranked  first in the distribution  of the proceeds  that  result from  the disposition  of the assets of a bankrupt  firm. Equals  zero if
non-secured  creditors,  such as the Government  and workers,  are given  the absolute  priority.  Bankruptcy  and  Reorganization  Laws.
Management  does  not stay: Equals  one when  an official  appointed  by the court,  or by the creditors,  is responsible  for the operation  of the business  during  reorganization.  Equivalently,
this variable  equals  one if the debtor  does not  keep  the administration  of its property  pending  the resolution  of the reorganization  process,  and zero otherwise.  Bankruptcy  and
Reorganization  Laws.
Creditor  rights: An index  aggregating  different  creditor  rights. The  index  is formed  by adding I when:  (1) the country  imposes  restrictions,  such as creditors' consent  or minimum
dividends  to file for reorganization;  (2) secured  creditors  are able  to gain possession  of the security  once  the  reorganization  petition  has been  approved  (no automatic  stay);  (3)
secured  creditors  are ranked  first in the distribution  of the proceeds  that  result from  the disposition  of the assets  of a bankrupt  firm;  and (4)  the debtor  does not retain  the
administration  of its property  pending  the resolution  of the reorganization.  The index  ranges  from 0 to 4. Company  Law of Commercial  Code.
Legal  reserve: Equals  the minimum  percentage  of total  share capital  mandated  by the Corporate  Law  to avoid  the dissolution  of an existing  firm. It takes  a value  of zero for  countries
without  such restriction.  Company  Law of Commercial  Code.
Source: La Porta,  Rafael;  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Florencio;  Shleifer,  Andrei;  and Vishny,  Robert W,  1998 "Law and  Finance,  " Journal  of Political  Economy,  106(December),  pp. 1113-1155.
53TABLE 5
MEASURES OF CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATION
IN COUNTERPARTY  PROTECTIONS
Country  Risk of  Rule of Law  Contract  Efficiency  of  Bureaucratic
Expropriation  Enforceability  Judicial System  Quality
High Income
Australia  8.71  10.00  3.04  10  00  6.00
Austria  9.60  10.00  3.30  9.50  5.64
Belgium  9.48  10.00  3.29  9.50  6.00
Canada  8.96  10.00  3.27  9.25  6.00
Cyprus  7.50  5.98  4.32
Denmarkc  9.31  10.00  3.24  10.00  6.00
Finland  9.15  10.00  3.00  10.00  6.00
France  9.19  8.99  2.47  8.00  6.00
Gennany  9.77  9.23  3.40  9.00  5.96
Greece  6.63  6.19  2.33  7.00  3.36
Hong  Kong  8.82  8.21  10.00  4.14
Iceland  9.25  10.00  6.00
Ireland  8.96  7.80  3.17  8.75  5.46
Israel  7.54  4.82  3.00  10.00  4.29
Italy  9.17  8.33  2.10  6.75  4.43
Japan  9.69  8.99  3.16  10.00  5.89
Korea  8.59  5.36  2.19  6.00  4.18
Luxembourg  10.00  10.00  6.00
Netherlands  9.35  10.00  3.26  10.00  6.00
New Zealand  9.29  10.00  10.00  6.00
Norway  9.71  10.00  3.43  10.00  5.32
Portugal  8.S7  8.69  1.92  5.50  3.70
Singapore  8.86  8.57  3.22  10.00  5.11
Spain  8.40  7.80  2.57  6.25  4.11
Sweden  9.58  10.00  3.30  10.00  6.00
Switzerland  9.98  10.00  3.59  10.00  6.00
Taiwan  9.16  8.52  6.75
United  Kingdom  9.63  8.57  3.43  10.00  6.00
United  States  9.00  10.00  3.55  10.00  6.00
Middle-upper  Income
Argentina  4.91  5.36  2.01  6.00  3.00
Barbados
Brazil  6.30  6.31  1.97  5.75  4.00
Chile  6.80  7.02  2.44  7.25  3.36
Malaysia  7.43  6.79  2.26  9.00  3.54
Mauritius  0.00
Mexico  6.55  5.36  1.77  6.00  2.89
Oman
Saudi  Arabia
South  Africa  7.27  4.42  2.67  6.00  6.00
Trinidad  & Tobago  6.63  6.67  3.11
Uruguay  7.29  5.00  6.50  2.00
Venezuela  6.30  6.37  1.64  6.50  2.89
54TABLE 5 continued
Country  Risk of  Rule of Law  Contract  Efficiency  of  Bureaucratic
Expropriation  Enforceability  Judicial System  Quality
Middle  Lower
Bolivia  4.57  2.20  1.76  1.14
Botswana  6.71  8.33  3.71
China  6.29  5.97  2.00  3.04
Colombia  7.02  2.08  1.90  7.25  4.00
Costa  Rica  5.79  6.67  2.89
Ecuador  5.18  6.67  1.86  6.25  3.00
Egypt  6.05  4.17  2.09  6.50  2.64.
Indonesia  6.09  3.99  1.76  2.50  1.50
Iran
Jamaica  6.46  3.51  3.04
Jordan  4.86  4.35  8.66  3.00
Morocco  5.43  4.46  1.95  2.93
Namibia  4.42  6.61  4.42
Panama  5.11  3.51  1.11
Peru  4.68  2.50  1.72  6.75  2.11
Philippines  4.80  2.74  1.75  4.75  1.46
Sri Lanka  5.25  1.90  7.00  3.00
Swaziland  0.00
Thailand  7.57  6.25  2.23  3.25  4.39
Tunisia  5.54  4.64  3.00
Turkey  5.95  5.18  2.00  4.00  3.29
Low Income
Bangladesh  4.09  2.26  1.21
Cote d'lvoire  6.40  5.64  2.58  4.00
Ghana  5.77  3.33  2.71
Honduras  5.20  3.45  1.57
India  6.11  4.17  2.00  8.00  3.82
Kenya  5.66  5.42  2.16  5.75  3.61
Nepal  0.00
Nigeria  4.36  2.74  1.68  7.25  2.29
Pakistan  4.88  3.04  1.69  5.00  2.71
Zimbabwe  5.04  3.69  7.50  3.43
Risk of Expropriation: International  County  Risk's (ICR)  assessment  of the risk of "outright  confiscation"  or "forced
nationalization".  Average  of the months  of April  and October  of the monthly  index  between  1982  and 1995.  Scale  from 0 to 10,  with
lower scores for higher risks. Source: International Country Risk Guide
Rule of Law: Assessment  of the law  and order  tradition  in the country  produced  by the country-risk  rating  agency  Intemational
County  Risk (ICR).  Average  of the months  of April  and  October  of the monthly  index  between  1982  and 1995.  Scale  from  0 to 10,
with lower  scores  for less  tradition  for law and  order.  Source:  International  Country  Risk Guide
Contract Enforceability:  Measures  the "relative  degree  to which  contractual  agreements  are  honored  and  complications  presented  by
language  and mentality  differences".  Scored  0-4, with  higher  scores  for superior  quality.
Source:  Business  Environmental  Risk  Intelligence
Efficiency  of Judicial System:  Assessment  of the "efficiency  and integrity  of the legal  environment  as it affects  business,  particularly
foreign  firms"  produced  by the  country  risk-taking  agency  Business  International  Corporation.  It "may  be taken  to represent
investors'  assessments  of conditions  in the country  in question".  Average  between  1980-1983.  Scale  from  0 to 10. with  lower  scores
for low efficiency  levels.
Bureaucratic Quality: Average  of "bureaucratic  quality"  assessment  values  assigned  by ICRG  between  1982-1995.  Scored  0- 6,
with higher  scores  for superior  quality.
55TABLE 6
CROSS-COUNTRY  VARIATION IN DEPOSIT-INSURANCE  DESIGN FEATURES
DEPOSIT  Type  Date  Membership Administration Funding  Premium  or Assessment  Annual  Prtmium  Coverage  Limit  Foreign  Interbanlk  Source  of
INSURANCE  Enected/  Bast  Currency  Deposits  Funding
SYSTEMS  Revised
official=1  % of  base  in ecu  or U.S.  dollars  /6  0 = Banks  Only
explicit=l  compulsory=l  joint--2  funded=l  yes=l  yes=l  1= Banks  & Gov.
implicit=0  voluntary=0  private=3  unfunded=0  no=  no=  2= Govemment
.______________________  ._________________________  __________________  O  nly
Africa  _________
Benin  0  .
Burundi  0
Burkina Faso  0
Cameroon  1999  0  l2  deposits  and  nonperforming 0.15%  of depositsT+O0.5%  of  $5,336  0
loans  npls
Central  Afiican  Rep.  01992  1  deposits  and  nonperforrning 0.1  5%  of  deposits  + 0.5%  of  S3,557  0
loans  npis
Chad  I  1999  0  2  1  deposits  and nonperforming 0.15%  of deposits  +0.5% of  S3,557
loans  npls
Congo  1  1999  02  - deposits  and nonperforming 0.15%  of deposits  + 0.5%  of  $3,557  0  I  1
______  __  __  _____  loans  ispis  . _  _  _  _
Cote dIlvoire  0  loans  np_s
Equatorial  Guinea  1  1999  0  2  I  deposits  and  nonperfonning  0.  15%  of deposits  + 0.5%  of  $3,557  0  1  I
Gabon_________  ________  loans  npis
Gabon  1  1999  0  2  I  deposits  and  nonperforming 0.15%  of deposits+  0.5%of  $5,336  0
___  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  _  __  ______  loans  npls  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Ghana  0loansnpls
Guinea  0
Kenya  1985  deposits  0.15  S1,50  I
Mali  0  . ,
Nigeria  I  1988  deposits  0.9375  S588 / $2435  0
Seychelles  0
South Africa  0
Tanzania  1994  3  1  deposits  0.1  S376___
Togo  .
Uganda  1994  1  I  I  deposits  0.2  S2,310  I
Zaire  0, 
Zambia  O  __.__
Zimbabwe  0
Asia  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _.__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  '  _  _  _  _  _  _DEPOSIT  Type  Date  Membership Administration Funding  Premium  or Assessment  Annual  Premium  Coverage  Limit  Foreign  Interbank  Source  of
INSURANCE  Enacted/  Base  Currency  Deposits  Funding
SYSTEMS  Revised
official=)  % of base  in ecu  or U.S. dollars  0 = Banks Only
/6
explicit=l  compulsory-I  joint-2  funded-I  . __  yes=l  yes=I  1 Banks  & Gov.
Implicit=o  voluntary=0  private=3  unfunded  no=O  no=O  2= Government
-O_  _  _  _  _  _  _  Only
Bangladesh  1  1984  1  _  I  deposits  0.005  $2,123  0  0
China  0
Hong  Kong-  0
India  1  1961  1  1  _  deposits  0.005  $2,355  I  O  I
Indonesia  O
Kiribati  0
Korea  I  1996  1  1  1  deposits  0.05  $14,600  but  in full  0 1  01I
until the  year  2000
Malaysia  0
Macshall  Islands  I  1975  0  1  deposits  risk-based  0.00  to 0.27  - S100,000  I  I0
Micronesia  1963  0  1  I  deposits  risk-based  0.00  to 0.28  $100  000  I  I  0
Nepal  0  _  _
New Zealand  0  _
Pakistan  0  _
Papua  New Guinea  0
Philippines  1  1963  T  I  I  deposits  0.2  $2,375  I  I
Singapore  0
Sri Lanka  I  1987  0  I  I  deposits  0.15  $1,470  0  0
Taiwan  1  1985  0  1  I  insured  deposits  0.015  $38,500  0  0
Thailand  0
Vietnam  0
Transitional  __ 
Soeialist
Economies
Bulgaria  I  1995  1  2  I  insured  deposits  risk based  to 0.5  $1,784  I  0
Croatia  I  1997  I  23/  I  insured  deposits  0.8  $15,300  12/  0
Czech  Rep.  I  1994  l  I  I  insured  deposits  commercial  banks;  0.5,  savings coinsurance  to 11756  0  0
I  banks  0.1 
Estonia  l  1  1998  I  2  I  deposits  until 2002  0.5  (max)  coinsurance  90°/ of  I  0
I__________  1383,  but ecu  in 2010
Hungary  1  1993  I  2  i  insured  deposits  risk  based  to 0.3  ecu  4165  orS4565  I  0DEPOSIT  Type  Datc  Membership  Administration  Funding  Prenium  or Assessment  Annual  Premium  Coverage  Limit  Foreign  interbank  Source  of
INSURANCE  Enaeted/  Base  Currency  Deposits  Funding
SYSTEMS  Revised
official=l  _  of base  0=  Banks Only
/6
explici  P  I  compulsory=l  joint-2  funded=l  yesyl  =Banks  & Gov
implicitO  voluntary=O  private=3  unfunded  no=0  no=0O  2= Government
=0  Only
Poland  1  1995.  1  1  1  deposits, also risk-adjusted  not more than 0 4  ecu 1000, then 90%  1  0  I
assets  coinsurance for the
next ecu 4000
Romania  1  1996  2  insured  deposits  risk-based 0.3 to 0.6  $3,600  1  0  _  _
Slovak Republic  1  1996  1  2  Iinsured  deposits  0.1 to 0.3 for banks  S7,900  I  0
Latvia  1  1998  1  I  itinsured  deposits  0.3  $830 until year 2000  1  0
Lithuania  I  99I  I  insured deposits  5  S6250 then  I  0  O
coinsurance
ICazakstan0  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Kyrgyz  Republic  0_
Macedonia  1  1996  0  2  - insured deposits  1.5, risk-based 1% to 5%  coinsurance 75% to  0  I
Russia  0
Ukraine  1  1998  1  1  _  total deposits  0.5 plus special charges  $250  1  0
Middle East  _  _  _
Bahrain  _  _  _  1993  _  _  _2  _0  _  deposits  ex post  $5,640  1  0  0
Cyprus  0  ._  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Egypt  0  _
Iran  0
Lebanon  O  1967  1  2  credit accounts  0.05  $3,300  0  I  _
Libya-  0  ___
Otman  1  1995  0  1  deposits  coinsurance 75% to  I  0
S52,630
Saudi Arabia  0
Turkecy  0  1983  I  I  I  insured savings deposits  risk-based 1.0to  1.2  int f  0 
UnitedArab  0
Emirates  __  _  _  _  _  _  __  ___  __  _  _  _DEPOSIT  Type  |  Date  Membership  Administration|  Funding  Premium or Assessment  Annual Premium  Coverage  Limit  Foreign  Interbank  Source  of
INSURANCE  Enaeted/  Base  Currency  Deposits  Funding
SYSTEMS  Revised  ______  ______
officia=l  %  of bisse  in ecu  or U.S.  dollars  0  =  Banks  Only
/6
explicit=I  compulsory=  l  joirt=2  fiunded=l  _  yes=l  yes=t  1=  Banks  &  Cov.
implicit-0  voluntary=0  private=-3  unfunded  no=0  no'=0  2= Government
.__  _  =0  JO  _______  _____  __  Only
Central and Latin
America
Argentina  1971,  1979,  insured  deposits  risk-based,  0.36  to 0.72  30,000  I  0  0
1995
Belize  0  _
Bolivia  0
BirTazi  T  _  1995  1  - 3  I  insured  deposits  0.3  1-  I7,000  --  I  0  -- 0
Chile  1  1986  _  I  0  not  applicable  none  demand  deposits  in  I  0  2
full and  90%
coinsurance  to UF 120
of $3,600  for savings
deposits
Colombia  I  1985  1  _  insured  deposits  0.3  in full untill 2001,  1  0
then  coinsurance  to
_________  S__________  $5,500
Costa  Rica  0
Dominican  Republic  I  1962  0  2  1  deposits  0.1875  coinsuranceto  $13000  O  0  _  I
Ecuador  I  1999  I  I  I  deposits  0.65  in full to year  2001  I  n.a.
El Salvador  1  1999  1  1  I  insured  deposits  risk-based,  0.1 to 0.3  $4,720  _  0
Guatemala  0  _  _
Guyana  i  0
Honduras  0ii_
Jamaica  1  1998  1  1  1  insured  deposits  0.1  $5,512  I  0
Mexico  1  1986  1  1  I  all obligations  0.3  (max) plus  0.7  as needed  in full except  I  I
subordinatcd  dcbt
_______________  i_______  i_________  __________  ____________  _______  until  2005  ___________  _________  ________un  i  20
Panama  0  _  i  _  i
Paraguay  0
Peru  1  1992  I  2  1  insured  deposits  risk-based  from 0.65  to 1.45  $21,160  I
Trinidad & Tobago  1  |  1986  |  I  I  I  deposits  0.2  $7,957  i1
Uruguay  0
Venezuela  §  I  |  j1985  I  I  I  insured  deposits  2  $7,309  00  IDEPOSIT  Type  Date  Membership  Administration  Funding  Premium or Assessment  Annual  Premium  Coverage  Limit  Foreign  Interbank  Source  of
INSURANCE  Enacted}  Base  Currency  Deposits  Funding
SYSTEMS  Revised
official=1  % of bsse  in ecu or U.S. dollars  0 =  Banks  Only
. ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ____  /6  _____
explicitP1  compulsory-I  joint=2  fundcd=l  yes=l  yes=l  1= Banks  &Gov.





Austria  1979  1  3  0  insured  deposits  pro rata, expost  $24,075  but  I * 
coinsurance  for
businesses
Belgium  l  1974  l  2  1  insured  liabilities  0.02  + 0.04  ecu 15000,  20000  in  1 +  0
year  20000
Canada  1  967  1  1  1  insured  deposits  0.33  max  S40,770  0  2
Denmark  1  1988  I  2  - I  insured  deposits  0.2 (max)  ecu  20000  . 1  0  _
Finland  1  - 1969  1  3  1  insured  deposits  risk based:  0.05  to 0.3  529,435  I  0
France  1  1980  1  3  0  n.a.  on  demand  but limited  65387  1 *0  0
Germany  1  1966  1  3  1  insured  deposits  in  official is  0.03 but  can be  private:  30%  of  0
commercial  banks  DIS,  risk-  doubled  capital; official
assets  in other  DIS  coinsurance  90% to
ecu  20000
Gibraltar  1998  - 2  0  insured  deposits  admin.expenses  and  expost  lesser  of 900/  - 16  0
coinsurance  of ecu
20000
Greece  1  1993  1  2  I  deposits  decreasing  by size:  0.0025  to  20,000  ECU  0  0
_____  ____  ____  ____  _____  ____  ____  ____  _____  ____  ____ __  _ _____  ____ ____ ____ ___  1.25
Iceland  1  1985  1  1  l  insured  deposits  0.15  ecu  20000  0  0
Ireland  1  1989  I  1  I  EU and  EEA,  i.e insured  0.2  coinsurance  90%  to  I**  0  0
deposits  ecu 15000
Italy  I  19B7  2 4/  0  protected  funds  adjusted  for  risk adjusted  expost  0.4 to 0.S  $  12  5,000  0
size and  risk
Japan  1  1971  I  2  T  insured  deposits  0.0048  + 0036  $71000,  but  in fll  - 0  0
_________  __________  ___________  ____________  until M  arch  2001  _  _  __  _
Luxembourg  1989  3  insured  deposits  ex post  coinsurance  90% to0  0
ecu 15000  thru 1999,
.______________  ______  ___  _ ______  __  __  _____  ______  _____  ____  _____  then  to  ecu  20000DEPOSIT  Type  Date  Membership  Administration  Funding  Premium  or Assessment  Annual  Premium  Coverage  Limit  Foreign  interbank  Source  of
INSURANCE  Enacted/  Base  Currency  Deposits  Funding
SYSTEMS  Revised  _____B_ks_O_-_y
official=  I  %  of base  in ecu  or U.S.  dollars  0  Banks  Only
,explicit-1  compulsory=l  joint--2  funded=l  _yes=i  yes=l  = BanksG&o  Gov.
impicii  voluntiiry=  private=  unfunded  no=0  no=0  2= Government
=0  __  _  _  _  _  _Only
Netherands  I  1979  1  I  case  by  case  expost  ecu  20000  I  0
Norway  1961  3 5/  1  risk-weighted  assets  and total  0.005  assets  0.01  deposits  S260,S00  I  0
deposits
Portugal1  1992  1  1  1  insured  deposits  risk-based  0.08  to 0.12  + more  ecu 15000,  1  0
in emcrgencies  coinsurance  to  ecu
45000
Spain  iI  1977  I  2  T  insured  deposits  max.  of 0.2  ecu 15000  through  1  0
1999,  then  ecu 20000
Sweden  I  199)6  I  I  insured deposits  risk-based, 0.5 npw, 0.1 later  ecu 28663 $31412  I  0  I
Switzerland  1  1984  0  0  balance  sheet  items  on demand  $19,700  0  0  0
United  Kingdom  192  3  0  EEA  deposits  i.e.  insured  on demand  larger  of 90/.  0  0
deposits  coinsurance  to
1$33,333 or ecu 22,222
United  States  I  1934  1  1  1  domestic  deposits  risk-based,  0.00  to 0.27  S100,000  I * *
*  Coverage is extended to deposits in the domestic currency, ecus or the currencies  of other members of the EU.
** * Coverage  is extended to deposits in sterling, ecus or the currencies of other members of the European  Economic Area (which include EU).
1/ Korea has placed a temporary full guarantee on deposits.
2/ Croatia excludes foreign currency deposits placed prior to 1993  as they were covered by an issuance  of government bonds.
3/ In Croatia, the system is administered by a private agency, but some decisions  must be approved by the central bank.
4/ Although the scheme is privately run in Italy, all decisions must be approved by the central bank so the DIS has little authority.
5/ Norway has two schemes. Both are privately run, but each has two public members on its seven-member  board - one from the central bank and the other from the Banking and
Securities Commission.
6/ Exchange rates at the end of June 1998.
7/ Coverage in Nigeria is higher at the official exchange rate than at the market rate.
8/ The premium in Belgium can be raised by a maximum of 0.004 percent when the funds' liquid assets fall below a critical level.
9/ The premium charged by the private deposit insurance  schemes in Germany vary by scheme from 0.004 to 0.1 percent.
10/ Coverage in Iceland in principle is full. The minimum is ecu 20,000. Above that, payment is in proportion to the resources  of the fund.
11/ Coverage in Latvia will rise gradually to ecu 20,000 by the year 2008.
12/ in the Netherlands, the ex post assessments  are made case-by-case  on the bases of several items of data recently reported to the central bank. A comparison is made between the
portfolios of the failed bank and the assessed bank. Costs are apportioned after consultation with the bankers' committee.
13/ Article 25 of the deposit insurance law in Poland sets premiums  at no more than 0.4 percent of deposits. However, Article 13  states that premiums should not "exceed 0.4 percent of
the sum of assets rated according to risk".14/  Turkey  has provided  unlimited  coverage  since  May 1994.
15/  In Argentina,  deposits  that pay more  than 200 basis  points above  the reference  rate are not insured.
16/  Premiums  in Colombia  will  become  risk-based  in the year 2000.
17/  The  premium  in Peru is computed  to the maximum  amount  insured  and applies  only  to deposits  of individuals  and non  profit institutions.  Banks  pay 0.65  percent of total  deposits  plus
0.2  percent  for each higher  risk category.
Source:  "Deposit  Insurance:  A Survey  of Actual  and Best  Practices".  Prepared  by Gillian  G.H. Garcia,  Working  Paper  International  Monetary  Fund, Monetary  and Exchange  Affairs
Department,  c 1999  (Washington,  D.C.)TABLE 7
PRINCIPAL  COMPONENTS  ANALSIS OF BINARY VARIABLES INDICATING
EXISTENCE  OF EIGHT  SAFETY-NET DESIGN FEATURES  AS PART OF THE
EXPLICIT  DEPOSIT-INSURANCE  SYSTEMS OF 40 COUNTRIES
Component  Eigenvalue  Proportion of  Cumulative Proportion
Covariance Explained  Explained
1  2.35396  0.294  0.294
2  1.54301  0.193  0.487
3  1.03226  0.130  0.616
4  0.92069  0.115  0.731
5  0.74728  0.093  0.825
6  0.67318  0.084  0.909
7  0.41151  0.051  0.960
8  0.31811  0.040  1.000
Eigenvectors
Design  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
Feature
Involuntariness  0.03446  0.70951  0.13933  0.09557  0.05198  0.02037  -0.67204  -0.11001
CL  0.13924  -0.23528  0.75875  0.41237  -0.11961  0.39312  -0.00576  -0.10311
CI  0.38789  0.20163  -0.34568  0.25071  -0.63197  0.29205  0.09714  0.36390
PM  0.50853  -0.14058  0.07508  0.05889  0.51626  -0.15133  -0.16602  0.62892
Funded at all  -0.43254  0.15256  -0.16777  0.04716  0.39988  0.71419  0.11848  0.27433
Privately Funded  0.46589  -0.06180  -0.39694  0.29620  0.35720  0.20512  0.05075  -0.60133
Foreign-Den.  0.25809  0.57313  0.29976  -0.22588  0.13917  -0.05078  0.66413  -0.04658
Interbank  -0.31561  0.16250  -0.06841  0.78327  0.10107  -0.42677  0.23161  0.10139
Note: All variables are binary. Each variable takes on the value of unity when the
specified design feature is present. "Involuntariness" indicates that membership is
mandatory; CL indicates that nominal coverage limits are specified; CI indicates that
coinsurance exists for at least some depositors; "funded at all" indicates that deposit-
insurance obligations are funded in some way; "privately funded" indicates that funding
comes exclusively from private sources; "foreign-Den." indicates that foreign-
denominated deposits are explicitly covered; "interbank" indicates that interbank deposits
are formally guaranteed.TABLE 8
CALCULATED  VALUES OF THE FIRST THREE PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS
OF SAFETY-NET  DESIGN FEATURES IN 40 COUNTRIES
Susceptibillty  to  idden
Countries  Degree of Privatization  Breadth of Coverage  Risk Shifting
Argentina  0.974  0.997  0.708
Austria  1.328  1.107  0.927
Belgium  -0.001  1.199  1.030
Bangladesh  -0.259  0.627  0.730
Brazil  0.974  0.997  0.708
Canada  -0.574  0.789  0.666
Switzerland  1.114  -OA38  0.437
Chile  0.432  1.046  1.198
Colombia  0.279  0.928  -0.077
Germany  1.362  1.198  0.363
Denmark  -0.001  1.199  1.030
Spain  -0.001  1.199  1.030
Finland  0.508  1.058  1.105
France  1.406  0.844  0.876
United  Kingdom  1.794  1.046  0.530
Greece  0.465  1.137  0.633
India  -0.001  1.199  1.030
Ireland  0.853  1.339  0.287
Iceland  0.714  1.574  -0.471
Italy  0.820  1.248  0.852
Jamaica  -0.001  1.199  1.030
Japan  -0.398  0.862  -0.028
Kenya  -0.316  1.361  0.965
Korea  -0.259  0.627  0.730
Sri  Lanka  -0.293  -0.083  0.591
Luxembourg  1.794  1.046  0.530
Mexico  -0.456  1.597  0.207
Nigeria  -0.574  0.789  0.666
Netherlands  0.432  1.046  1.198
Norway  0.508  1.058  1.105
Oman  0.387  1.401  0.684
Peru  -0.001  1.199  1.030
Philippines  -0.316  1.361  0.985
Portugal  0.387  1.401  0.684
Sweden  -0.001  1.199  1.030
Trinidad  Tobago  -0.316  1.361  0.965
Turkey  -0.140  1.434  0.271
Taiwan  -0.293  -0.083  0.591
United  States  -0.316  1.361  0.965
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